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METAPHORICAL IMAGINATION:
THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF
FETUSES AND EMBRYOS
Kayan Parsi"
While we embrace the many medical advances brought to us by
fetal research, we are troubled by simultaneously treating the fetus
as a tissue catalog and as a baby, as a non-consenting research
subject and as a patient, as property and as a person.
Steven Alaynard-MAood t
Our various slowly evolved descriptive and explanatory
vocabularies are like the beaver's slowly evolved teeth and tail:
they are admirable devices for improving the position of our
species. But the vocabularies of physics and of politics no more
need to be integrated with one another than the beaver's tail needs
to be integrated with its teeth.
Richard Rortv,
"Associate Director of Academic Affairs, Institute for Ethics, Amearzcn Mediceal
Association, Chicago, IL. B.A., Rice University, 19S7; .LD., University of Houzton La . Ccrter,
1993; Ph.D., University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, 1998. The opinion: e~pre::cA are
the author's alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the American Mcdical Aczimation
or any of its divisions or affiliates.
This article is based on a dissertation I defended for the Ph.D. at the Institute for the Mcdical
Humanities at UTMB-Galveston. I am indebted to the following people for their input and
comments: Bill Winsdlade, Chester Bums, Harold Vanderpool, Davis Rassin, John Robrtzn,
Walter Glannon, Charles Hinkley, Stephen Latham, Anil Shivaram, IKnsty Schrode, and Deborah
Cummins. This article is dedicated to my wife Lara Bonasera. I would alzo like to then: the
AMA's Institute of Ethics for its support of me from 1997 to 199S while I wrote much of my
dissertation.
'STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY, TIIE DiLF-MA OF THE FETUS 185 (New York St, Martin's
Press, 1995).
2Richard Rorty, Against Unity, WILSoN Q., Winter 199S, at 29.
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We live in and by the law .... It is sword, shield and menace
.... We are subjects of law's empire, liegemen to its methods and
ideals, bound in spirit while we debate what we must therefore do.
Ronald Dworkin'
Trying to characterize the legal and moral status of fetal and embryonic
life has posed significant challenges for judges, legislators, philosophers,
and theologians.4 Moral and legal status often encompasses issues of
personhood, interests, and suffering. Is the fetus a person? Is the embryo
a piece of property? Does a fetus have interests? Does the fetus suffer?
On the one hand, these are not idle questions because they go to the heart
of the question asked by the United Kingdom's Warnock Report: "How
is it right to treat the embryo?"5 Many American legal cases have
addressed this very topic. This article urges the recognition of the
different metaphors used in describing the unborn because it can yield a
deeper understanding of the issues presented.
Some commentators believe, for instance, that human embryos and
fetuses are separate persons, endowed with certain rights from the time of
conception. Others may believe that embryos and fetuses are indeed
nothing but appendages to the mother, perhaps even just glorified human
tissue. Alternatively, our moral sensibilities toward fetuses and embryos
can be analogized to that of higher animals. For instance, humans protect
certain higher animals for a variety of deontological and consequentialist
reasons. Most higher animals can suffer and feel pleasure; this suggests
that humans have a duty not to cause these creatures unnecessary pain.
Moreover, torturing or mistreating animals not only harms them but also
coarsens our own moral sympathies and sensibilities. Similarly, we treat
embryos and fetuses in a certain manner not because they are persons in
a strict sense, but because they are along a developmental path toward
participation in the human community. The older a fetus is, the more it
looks like an infant and has the ability to feel pain. Because of these
3RONALD DWoRKyiN, LAw's EMPIRE vii (1986).
4The human embryo has been defined as "the developing organism from conception until
approximately the end of the second month; developmental stages from this time to birth are
commonly designated as fetal." STEDMAN'SMEDICALDICTIONARY 559 (Baltimore: Williams and
Wilkins, 1995).5Bartha Maria Knoppers and Sandrine Pascal-Rossi, The Nature and Status of the Embryo:
Common Law (paper presented at the Third Symposium on Bioethics, Medically Assisted
Procreation and the Status of the Embryo, Strasbourg, France, Dec. 15-18, 1996).
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intrinsic properties, we are careful not to injure fetuses that are on their
way to becoming infants and thus members of the human community.
This does not mean, however, that embryos and fetuses have a set of
absolute rights. It does mean that we have certainprimafacie duties that
may be overridden by other considerations (to protect, for instance, the
health or privacy interests of the mother).
The descriptive analysis of the legal cases and statutes surveyed here
reflect a plurality of views regarding the status of embryos and fetuses.
On one hand, judges have to craft law in a pragmatic manner, responding
to the real issues at hand. On the other hand, a normative argument does
not have to capitulate to practice. One could argue that despite the
plurality of legal views, only one moral view should prevail w ith regard
to embryos and fetuses. A broader approach would argue that our
complex and highly varied relations with animals is suggestive. We do
not regard animals as being persons in a strict sense, nor do we view them
in apurely instrumental fashion. Yet, because ofcertain biological criteria
(their ability to feel pain and pleasure) as well as their relational status to
persons, they merit a certain moral status. Similarly, embryos and fetuses
are neither persons in a strict sense, nor are they mere things. Because of
their potential personhood, as well as their relational status to persons,
they merit a certain moral status. Embryos and fetuses have a conferred
status, in addition to a certain intrinsic status. Embryos and fetuses have
an intrinsic status because of their potential personhood, as well as being
a part of the continuum of biological human life. The myriad of
metaphors used to describe the unborn reflects our deep ambivalence
regarding the moral and legal status of embryos and fetuses. The issues
here are too complex to render themselves to a single overarching theory
about the status of the unborn. Although some bioethicists, such as
Bonnie Steinbock, may find such an approach to be ad hoc and
intellectually unsatisfying, she herself argues that a basic moral theory is
unnecessary for doing applied ethics.6 She agrees with Joel Feinberg,
who admitted to a lack of a "deep structure" theory in his work Harm to
Others.7  This article analyzes the language judges, policymakers,
politicians and ethicists use in describing the unborn. Because words such
as "person' and "property" are frequently used in describing the unborn,
6BONNIE STEINBOCK, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF E.sBrYOS
AND FETUSES 8 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press 1992).
7Id.
1999]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAWV
these words become broad metaphors in assessing the moral worth of the
unborn.
As a response to principle-based bioethics, the claim that we use
metaphor and narrative in our moral reasoning has become quite common
in the bioethics and medical humanities literature. In their seminal text
Metaphors We Live By, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argue that our
understanding of the world is inevitably metaphorical.' They argue that
"[t]he essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of
thing in terms of another."9 In a later book, Moral Imagination, Johnson
takes the metaphorical approach one step further and argues that our moral
reasoning is deeply metaphorical.'0 He claims that:
[m]orality is metaphoric through and through. Our folk models of
morality are based on systematic metaphors. Our mundane, mostly
automatic and unreflective moral understanding and reasoning are
inextricably tied up with metaphors. And even our most abstract,
'pure' rationalistic theories of morality are shot through with
metaphor.... [O]ur most fundamental notions of action, purpose,
rights, duties,personhood, and so forth are irreducibly metaphoric,
so that any moral theory in our tradition will necessarily
appropriate some set of basic metaphors for such concepts. This
follows from the pervasively metaphoric character of human
cognition, and not from any idiosyncratic conditions peculiar to
morality (emphasis added)."
Fetuses and embryos are often understood in terms of person, property or
as appendage. These metaphors have dominated the views of common
law judges and ethicists regarding human embryos and fetuses. Although
no single metaphor captures fully the status of the unborn, the metaphor
of stewardship provides us with a better way to view our moral
relationship with the unborn.
Some common, every-day metaphors are explicit ("the law is a
jealous mistress"), but others are more subtle. Judges often use analogies
in their legal reasoning and employ more subtle metaphors in their
opinions. For instance, judges often frame their analyses of the fetus
'GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIvE BY 5 (1979).
91d.
"°MARK JOHNSON, MORAL IMAGINATION 76 (1993).
1Id.
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regarding whether it is a person or not; this issue of personhood has
dominated the debate among many bioethicists as well. Bioethicists such
as H.T. Engelhardt think of persons as the constituents of the moral
community.12 Only persons can be blamed or praised; only persons can
have both duties and rights. 13 For him, embryos and fetuses are non-
persons.14 On the other hand, self-consciousness plays an important role
for theologians such as James Walters.15 In his trenchant book Mat is a
Person?, Walters argues "that the more nearly an individual human or
animal approximates a life of self-consciousness (such as yours or mine),
the greater the claim of that individual to maximal moral status."' 6
Because an embryo or even late-term fetus has no self-consciousness, its
moral status is low. 17  Walters argues for a theory of proximate
personhood, which can metaphorically be described as "the closeryou are
to being a person, the greater status you have."' 8 For others, such as
Steinbock, having interests is what matters.'9 She has treated this topic
extensively in her work Life Before Birth: The Moral and Legal Status of
Embryos andFetuses.20 She develops a cogent theory ofher interest view,
arguing that this view can be readily applied to a variety of living and non-
living things: dead people, the permanently unconscious, anencephalic
infants, as well as embryos and fetuses.2' She argues that she is not
offering a "startlingly original conception of the status of the unborn...
[but wants] to elicit a view that is implicit in our legal traditions and
ordinary moral thinldng." She argues that her interest view provides
some coherence to the status of the unborn, rather than a purely ad hoc
approach.23
Ethicists who work in this area ofbioethics tend to be "lumpers"; that
is, they build single theories that "prove" the status of the unborn, one way
"H. TRISTRAMENGELHARDT, THEFOUNDATIONS OFBIOEI'CS 255 (Oxford: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1996).
131d.
1JAME sV. VALTERs, NVHATIsAPERsoN,? 4 (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1997).16Id.
1Id.
181d.
"STEINBOCK, supra note 6, at S.
20 d.
21id.
2id.
"STEINBOCK, supra note 6, at 90.
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or the other. Judges tend to be "splitters"; they take a more varied
approach to the status of the unborn. As Steinbock has noted:
The legal status of the unborn seems equally unclear. For example,
the legalization of abortion in 1973 was based in part on the
unborn's never having been recognized in law as a full legal
person. At the same time, fetuses have been considered as persons
for the purposes of insurance coverage, wrongful-death suits, and
vehicular homicide statutes. The legal status of the unborn thus
appears to vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, from context to
context, according to our purposes.24
The law rarely treats the unborn in a univocal fashion. Although judges
have often unreflectively considered the status of embryos and fetuses,
their approach is one that should inform our normative claims. Arguing
that embryos and fetuses are persons in a strict sense is about as
convincing as saying animals are. Nonetheless, we have the ability to
think creatively about their status. We can devise rules and regulations to
protect them, without being committed to the notion that they are persons
in a full, robust sense. Thus, the law takes a more pragmatic, Rortyesque
approach to these issues. Judges, policymakers and legislators view the
unborn in a variety of ways. As Rorty himself has stated:
Human beings, like computers, dogs, and works of art, can be
described in lots of different ways, depending on what you want to
do with them-take them apart for repairs, re-educate them, play
with them, admire them, and so on for a long list of alternative
purposes. None of these descriptions is closer to what human
beings really are than any of the others.25
Rorty could have also included embryos and fetuses in that list. They
too can be described in a variety of ways - as potential persons, as
subjects for research, or as future tort plaintiffs.
One commentator, Steven Maynard-Moody, acknowledges the
different metaphors we use in describing fetuses.26 The most common
241d. at 4.
25Rorty, supra note 2, at 28.
26MAYNARD-MOODY, supra note 1, at 83.
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metaphors are fetus as appendage, fetus as property and fetus as person'
He explains for example that:
In a minimalist view, the nonviable fetus is little more than a form
of the pregnant woman's bodily tissue: it is part of the woman
without separate identity or status. This image of the fetus as tissue
de-emphasizes the importance of the fetus's separate genetic
identity and is most tenable in the early gestational stages ....
Fetal remains are most commonly discarded in the same manner as
other by-products of surgery .... With no moral status, they are
simply thrown away.'
He goes on to describe the fetus as property metaphor:
A variation on this image of fetus as tissue is the view that the fetus
is property. The nature of tissue property rights varies depending
on how the fetus is defined. If the dead fetus is considered a dead
person, then legal tradition and precedent gives family members
only "quasi-property rights": the right to dispose of the body but
not the right to sell or profit from it. 9
And finally, he describes the fetus as person metaphor:
... [T]he fetus is not a spleen. Though wholly dependent on the
pregnant woman and unable to live outside her womb, a not-yet-
viable fetus is genetically distinct from the pregnant woman; it is
not an organ or tissue, but a body, suggesting to some that it can be
defined as a person... The view that the fetus is tissue or tissue
property is founded on complex scientific evidence about human
development and legal arguments about torts and rights, whereas
the image of the fetus as a baby is based on a simple, emotional
reaction to the form: it looks like a baby.o
This article attempts to examine these different metaphors as they
apply to various legal cases. These dominant metaphors of appendage,
person and property permeate the judicial opinions examined here. This
27Id.
'Id.
29Id. at 85.
"Id. at 86.
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article will present the position that these metaphors suggest that embryos
and fetuses have an important but derivative status. They occupy a role
within our moral web of duties not unlike higher animals. Millions of
developed fetuses' lives are extinguished every year for a variety of
reasons; similarly, millions of stray dogs and cats are euthanized every
year, for a variety of reasons. We raise some animals only to slaughter
and consume them. Yet, we also develop very close and intimate
relationships with our animal pets. Similarly, we invest a great deal of
emotion into the development of a gestating fetus. Yet, if it miscarries, we
do not normally conduct funeral services. We create laws that prohibit
cruelty to animals, yet we kill animals every day. This seeming
inconsistency toward animals does not seem to offend most persons'
moral sensibilities (except, perhaps, for a few vegans and radical animal
rights activists). And, similarly, allowing women to abort fetuses, yet
permitting children to recover for damages suffered as fetuses does not
offend most of our ordinary sensibilities either (at least for most
Americans who are tolerant of abortion). If, as Ralph Waldo Emerson
said, a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, then our
seeming inconsistency toward animals and fetuses should make us appear
as broad minded indeed."1 The variety of metaphors that we use in
describing the unborn attests to our pluralistic views, not unlike our views
toward animals. Treating an animal pet as a child yet simultaneously
conducting animal research does not offend most persons' sensibilities;
why should treating the unborn in a similar manner spark such
controversy? The courts themselves have adopted a variety of
metaphorical approaches to explain the status of the unborn, suggesting
that their status is indeed derivative and not strictly intrinsic. Although
courts traditionally have subscribed to the appendage metaphor, more and
more cases seem to be sympathetic to the person metaphor.
The very act of naming things in the world shapes the way we think
about and treat them. For instance, if one labels an entity a person, it
suggests that that entity has certain intrinsic rights, independent of one's
relationship with it. On the other hand, if one frames something as
"property," a wholly different way of thinking arises. Property does not
have any intrinsic rights of its own; the notion of property suggests the
bundle of rights and duties a person has with regard to the property
"
1MAYNARD-MOODY, supra note 1, at 86.
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(whether it is a physical object or something more intangible such as
intellectual property). Certain entities are "easy cases." Planes, trains and
automobiles typically fall under the category of property. They have no
intrinsic value independent of someone's property interests in them (they
may, however, have a certain aesthetic value). A healthy, competent,
adult human being is another example of an easy case. Such a creature is
not property, but rather a person. This suggests that such a human being
qua person cannot be treated in merely an instrumental fashion, as Kant
would argue, but must be treated as an end in itself. Harder eases involve
such beings as animals, the severely mentally disabled, PVS patients and,
of course, fetuses and embryos.
In trying to describe the moral status of both living creatures and
inanimate objects, we often talk metaphorically. One scholar who has
written extensively about medical metaphors is Emily Martin. For
instance, she argues that menstruation was traditionally thought of as an
in-take and outgo system that maintained the body's balance to remain
healthy.32 By the nineteenth century, however, this older metaphor was
being replaced by another metaphor that treated menstruation as
pathological. 33 The body came to be seen metaphorically as an industrial
system. 4 In Martin's view, menstruation carried "with it the connotation
of a productive system that has failed to produce... [with] the idea of
production gone awry, making products of no use, not to specification,
unsalable, wasted, scrap."35 Moreover, menopause came to be seen as a
"breakdown of central control. ' 3
6
As Martin attests, health care is replete with metaphors.3' We
pejoratively label permanently unconscious human beings as vegetables.
We say that the elderly suffering from dementia "aren't all there."
Women's bodies have been thought of metaphorically as "monstrous
because of the female's capacity to create monstrosity through her
capacity for generation." 38  And we frequently talk about fetal and
"EMILY MRTIN, THE ONWVoMA IN THE BODY: CULTURAL ANALYsIs OF REPRODUCTON 30
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1992).
33Id.
34Id.
3SId. at 46.
3'Id. at 51.
3"MARTIN, supra note 32 at 51.
3"Julia Epstein, The Sacred Body in Law and Literature: The Pregnant Imagination, Fdal
Rights, and Women's Bodies: A Historical Inquiry, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAW. 139, 146 (1995).
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embryonic life metaphorically. The fetus or embryo is a child, a pawn, a
parasite, a symbol, or an appendage, depending upon one's moral, legal
and political framework. Barbara Katz Rothman, for instance, has made
explicit the parasite metaphor of the fetus, where she describes:
thereigningmedical model ofpregnancy, as an essentially parasitic
and vaguely pathological relationship, [which] encourages the
physician to view the fetus and mother as two separate patients,
and to see pregnancy as inherently a conflict of interests between
the two. Where the fetus is highly valued, the effect is to reduce
the woman to what current obstetrical language calls the 'maternal
environment.'39
Moreover, depending upon the mother's emotional, financial and
social situation, the fetus can be seen as either a blessing or a burden. 40 As
Mark Johnson has noted, we tend to view the fetus very differently if we
understand it as a person in one frame and as a biological organism with
no personality in another frame.4' Yet that is what we frequently do when
we talk about embryonic and fetal life. This kind of framing occurs in the
law whenever the status of the embryo/fetus becomes an issue. Even the
word "status" connotes a metaphorical hierarchy. An adult human being
ranks at or near the top, a three-month-old fetus much lower, and a two-
day embryo at or near the bottom. But the concept of "status" is hardly
static. Our metaphors shift depending upon how we frame the issue. So,
for example, if a legal case arises which puts into issue questions of
property, the fetus/embryo will be framed differently than in a criminal
case.
With this in mind, it is no surprise that our language in describing the
fetus and embryo is rife with metaphor. Most metaphors usually compare
abstract concepts, such as time, life, and even ideas, to more concrete
examples. Thus time is money, life is ajourney and an idea is as good as
its foundation, whereby an idea is compared to a building.42 These kinds
of metaphors so thoroughly shape the way we think about these concepts
9Caroline Morris, Technology and the Legal Discourse of Fetal Autonomy, 8 UCLA
WoMEN's L.J. 47, 63 (1997) (quoting Barbara Katz Rothman, When a Pregnant Woman
Endangers her Fetus, HASTINGS CTR. REP. 24-25 (Feb. 1986)).40JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 9-10.411d.
42LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 46-5 1.
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that we often commodify time and treat life as a linear path from birth to
death. Metaphors can expand our imagination or limit the way we think
about such things. For instance, Westerners often think of time as a linear
path, but Buddhists think of time as being more cyclical.43
In addition to metaphors that make the abstract more concrete, there
are also those metaphors that compare a physical object to another
physical object or even to something more abstract. Take the common
expression, "the eyes are the windows to the soul." Not only are eyes
compared to windows, but the soul is compared to a building, whereby we
can examine its contents by looking through its metaphorical windows,
the eyes. One might say that this is merely a literary metaphor and that
the language judges and legislators use is more precise. How can such
labels as person or property be thought of as metaphors anyway? Writers
such as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson use the term metaphor in a
broad sense. A metaphor need not be only some sort of mental shorthand.
Rather, our language is invariably metaphorical. A "firmly implanted"
embryo conjures up a different image than saying it is "suspended" in
cryogenic preservation. These kind of subtle metaphors are more
prevalent in the legal opinions examined here than a cursory glance would
suggest. The embryo or fetus is undeniably some kind of physical thing,
but it is often compared to some abstract entity. Thus, saying the embryo
is a piece of property or that the fetus is a person compares the physical to
the abstract. Both property and personhood are indeterminate, abstract
concepts. If we frame the fetus as an appendage to the mother, then it
becomes more plausible to think of it as quasi-property, perhaps like an
organ.44 But if we frame the embryo or fetus as a distinct being with
certain rights, then it seems more reasonable to think of it as some sort of
person. This becomes even more apparent by examining the language
courts, policymakers, and ethicists use in describing fetal and embryonic
life. As Clifford Geertz has argued, laws are not simply an array of
practical rules for persons to resolve disputes or advance personal
interests.45 Rather, for Geertz, the law is "part of a distinctive manner of
43See generally id.
'Of course, property encompasses abstract entities as well, such as intellectual propzrty.
But property is usually concerned vith physical objects.45 MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN VESTEE LAW 8 (Cambridge, Ma.:
Harvard Univ. Press 1987).
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imagining the real."46 Similarly, Mark Johnson claims that our moral
reasoning is not one where we mechanically apply moral rules to differing
situations, but is rather a richly imaginative process, whereby thinking
morally demands the use of metaphor and narrative.47 Mary Ann
Glendon, in her astute analysis of abortion and divorce laws among
Western countries, sees the story that America is telling through its laws
(autonomy, individualism, anti-communitarianism) as a distinctly
different one from other Western countries.48 Each country has framed the
issue of fetal and embryonic life in a variety ofways.49 By framing a case
concerning a fetus or embryo as a property issue, a criminal issue, a civil
issue or as an abortion issue, the metaphorical understanding of the fetus
changes." Moreover, when policymaking panels composed of experts
from various fields talk about the fetus or embryo, the metaphors change
as well." The fetus is not just a victim of negligence or a symbol of
abortion politics, but becomes the focus of scientific scrutiny and federal
regulation.52 Embryos are experimented upon, frozen, stored and
discarded. Although the commercial trading of embryos is normally
prohibited, one would be hard pressed to deny the commodification of the
early embryo.
George Annas has commented that every national commission that
has examined the embryo calls it a "unique symbolic value that deserve[s]
society's respect and protection."5 3  Calling the fetus a "symbol" is a
popular metaphor. Other commentators speak in similar metaphorical
fashion of the embryo/fetus. John Robertson has often referred to the
embryo as a symbol ("respecting the early embryo as a symbol... is a
matter of choice, not moral duty").54 Engelhardt claims that persons
assign value to the embryo/fetus. In his view, the zygote may be thought
of as a form of property, albeit a "a special form of very dear property."'
461d.
47JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 9-10.48GLENDON, supra note 45, at 8.491d.
5od.
511d.
Sld.
53STEINBOCK, supra note 6, at 216.
'John Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV.
437, 448 (1990).
5sH. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHIcS 255 (Oxford: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1996).
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Thinking of the zygote as property paves the way for couples who embark
upon in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment to execute cryopreservation
disposition agreements in the case of divorce.56
The aim of this article is to explore the various metaphorical
understandings of the fetus/embryo as reflected in legal opinions and
statutory law. These various metaphors buttress the claim that the status
of embryos and early fetuses is conferred. Metaphor is invoked for a
variety of reasons: to provide richer moral understanding, to propagandize,
to persuade, to enlighten (yet another very common metaphor). The
advantage that metaphor provides is to enrich our moral understanding of
both abstractions and concrete events. As fetal life is examined within the
frames of criminal law, civil law, abortion or research, our views of the
embryo and fetus shift ever constantly.
Similar to animals, the variety ofmetaphors used to describe embryos
and fetuses strongly suggest that although they are neither persons nor
mere things, we can imaginatively create rules to guide our conduct
towards them. That is the basic ethical quandary over embryos and
fetuses, how should we think of these creatures? And, how do we treat
them in a manner that best reflects our moral imagination? Rather than
creating a new metaphor for embryos and fetuses, we should pay more
attention to the metaphor of stewardship with regard to the unborn.
AMERICAN CASE LAW
According to Glendon, "[m]ore than any other country, the United States
has given priority in its constitutional law to individual liberty and has
adopted aposture of rigorous official indifference toward moral issues."'
Web-like in its organization, the legal system of the United States is
highly complex, consisting ofmany differentjurisdictions. Reproductive
health law reflects the diverse and multi-layered nature of the American
legal system." Federal regulations, state statutes, and judicial cases have
all addressed the issue of embryonic and fetal life." Judges have assessed
the legal status of fetal/embryonic life in numerous cases, often without
561d.
s7Mary Ann Glendon, Legal Institution: A Beau Mentir Qui Vient Do Loin The 1938
Canadian Abortion Decision in Comparative Perspective, 83 N%,. U. L. REV. 569, 585 (1989).
581d.591d
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the assistance of statutory law; more recently, states have passed laws
regarding fetal experimentation. 6' A distinction should be made, however,
between substantive legal interpretations of the status of fetal and
embryonic life (as exemplified, for instance, in the case Davis v. Davis6)
and the procedural rules that govern avariety of reproductive technologies
involving embryonic and fetal life.62 Oftentimes, the substantive legal
interpretations are judicial opinions; procedural requirements and
prohibitions are usually found in statutory law (whether state or federal). 63
Depending upon the issue, there may be scant legislation or a good deal
of it.
During the era when abortions were criminalized, the fetus was
treated as a potential homicide victim. Yet, early negligence cases treated
the fetus as an appendage to the mother; it had no distinct identity and had
no standing to sue for prenatal injuries. This kind of confusion
surrounding the status of the unborn eventually created the "cipher
metaphor." This means that the unborn has no intrinsic status, but only
what persons confer upon it. This can be interpreted on two levels:
metaphysically and epistemologically. Metaphysically, we can say that
as a matter of reality, the fetus has no intrinsic worth. Its worth, then, is
merely a matter of social construction or convention. On the other hand,
an epistemological approach would argue that we do not really know what
the value of a fetus is and people have had different responses to the issue.
For a variety of reasons (its potential personhood, its relational status to
other persons) we do have some idea what the value of a fetus is.
However, the fetus's status is not purely a social convention. Animals
have some inherent status, simply because of their ability to suffer. As a
result, we create rules that demand humane treatment of animals.
Within the abortion debate, yet another metaphor emerged-the fetus
as symbol. Many of the abortion cases most vividly illustrate this
metaphor. In the 1980s, the metaphor of the embryo as property emerged
most significantly with the case of Davis v. Davis.64 Alternatively, a
number of states have passed homicide statutes that criminalize the
60Id.
"Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
62GLENDON, supra note 57, at 585.
63Id.
"Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 588.
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intentional harming of a fetus. 5 Again, the metaphor of homicide victim
emerges once again.
This section presents a survey of American case law and legislation
as they pertain to these metaphorical descriptions of the status of the
fetus/embryo. First, a long line of cases that have dealt with the status of
the late-term fetus, often in situations where the living child is suing for
prenatal injuries is examined. Then, attention is shifted to the current state
of legislation regarding embryo and fetal research in the different states.
Finally, an analysis of any federal regulations that address the status of
fetal and embryonic life vill be presented.
After reviewing the case law, it will be argued for a "special status"
for the embryo and early fetus, based on its potential personhood and its
relational status to other persons. The variety of metaphors used to
describe the unborn suggests our ambivalent views toward embryos and
fetuses. Similar to pet animals, human embryos and fetuses hold a special
place in our web of rights and duties. We grow strong emotional bonds
with pet animals, yet we euthanize them by the millions; similarly, many
women develop intense bonds with their fetuses, yet millions of fetuses
are aborted every year. Moreover, we use animals for food and research,
but we spend billions on taking care of our pet animals. Why then do we
seem to be troubled with embryo research? Just as people do not find the
seemingly contradictory relationship with animals to be seriously
troubling, they should not be deeply troubledAth using early embryos for
research and aborting fetuses, yet at the same time spending billions on
prenatal care.
Strachan Donnelley has argued that in the animals rights context,
there are three groups of people: the anthropocentric advocates of human
welfare and scientific progress, the staunch animal rights activists who
view animals as our moral equals, and then the "troubled middle... [who]
-wish to balance the undeniable benefits that result from scientific research
with a genuine concern for the well-being of animals."' This troubled
middle view could easily be applied to the issue of the status of embryos
and fetuses. The troubled middle position suggests the strong
ambivalence ordinary people have toward our treatment of the unborn.
6'See id. at 591.
6
"Strachan Donnelley, Speculative Philosophy, the Troublcd Middle and the Ethics of
Animal Experimentation, HASINGS CR. REP. 19, No. 2, 15 (Mar. 19S9).
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Nearly all of the cases in this area deal with late-term fetal life; only
more recent cases (such as Davis) address the legal status of embryos.67
In trying to determine the status of fetal and embryonic life, judges
historically only had a few authorities at their disposal. They would
frequently cite venerable British authorities such as Blackstone or Coke
or they would rely on the accretion of Anglo-American common law on
the topic (although occasionally American judges would look to Irish or
Canadian cases for some guidance). Blackstone's and Coke's
pronouncements on the fetus had strong theological overtones; Blackstone
called life a gift of God.68 Yet, what swayed early jurists most was the
common law which generally held that fetuses (and, of course, embryos)
were neither legal persons nor even human beings.69 As new scientific
and medical evidence began to appear, however, judges became more
deferential to the new evidence, although some would still defer to older
common law rulings.7 °
Birth as the Defining Event:
Civil Cases
American case law has been wrestling with the question of fetal and
embryonic life for over a hundred years. A late nineteenth century case,
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, was perhaps one of the earliest
cases. 71 In this case, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts reviewed a
lower court decision regarding a fatal injury to a fetus.72 A woman who
was four to five months pregnant fell on a defective road in the town of
Northampton.73 The fall precipitated a miscarriage of the fetus and the
fetus lived for about ten to fifteen minutes.74 The plaintiff based his claim
on a statement by Lord Coke of England.75 Coke surmised that if a
woman is "quick with child", takes a poison or is beaten, thereby causing
the death of the child, then this constitutes a murder.76 Holmes, however,
67Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 588.
6 Donnelley, supra note 66, at 15.
69Id.
70Id.
7'Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
731d,
74Id.
S"Id.
7Id.76Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 15.
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resisted analogizing this criminal case to the civil law arena. 7 Holmes
noted that no court had ever permitted an action to be maintained by an
infant who experienced injuries in his mother's uterus.73
Holmes further distinguished the Dietrich casewith the criminal case
that Coke addressed.79 Holmes argued that in the criminal case, the fetus
had to have quickened (i.e. moved) within the womb before criminal
charges could be filed against someone who killed the fetus." But with
a civil action, the time of the injury made little difference; regardless as to
whether the fetus was a young embryo or a mature fetus, the prenatal
injury would create a live injured child.81 Holmes also looked to another
Massachusetts statute for some guidance in this case." This statute
punished illegal attempts to procure a miscarriage.83 Although the
punishment was more severe if the woman died, there was no increase in
the severity of the punishment if the fetus died, even once it had left the
womb. 4 Holmes ultimately held that at the time of the injury, the fetus
was part of the mother, and therefore the mother could recover damages
for injuries to the fetus.85 The fetus itself, however, had no standing to sue
separately.
S6
The appendage metaphor held great appeal for a number of courts
early in this century. 7 Interestingly, the metaphor held greater currency
for cases where the live child was suing for prenatal damages." The fetus-
as-appendage metaphor incorporated into negligence theory treated the
mother and fetus as one entity.8 9 This metaphor made it much easier for
judges to view the fetus not as a being, which can be harmed, but rather
a part of the mother, which may be injured." Perhaps a good comparison
would be to an injury to an internal organ. First of all, an organ is
7
'1d.
781d.
79 d.
FoId.
S'Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 15.
2Id.
8Id.
"Id. at 17.
85Id.
"Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 17.
'See generally Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
sId.
"9Id.6Id.
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necessary for the health of a person; a fetus is not. Moreover, an organ
has no intrinsic identity of its own, any "status" it may possess is due to
the fact that it is attached to a person. A spleen, for instance, may be
injured, but it is the person, not the spleen, that can later sue for
compensation. The problem with the appendage metaphor is that unlike
a spleen, the fetus will eventually develop into a live child who may have
been harmed because of the injury suffered by its earlier fetal state.
The metaphor of fetus-as-appendage was even more greatly
illustrated in the 1900 Illinois case of Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital.9 An
expectant mother was seated in a chair positioned inside of a hospital
elevator.92 The top of the chair suddenly struck a projection on the side of
the shaft.93 The woman's left limb was caught between the floor and the
projection, whereby it became "greatly cut, mangled, bruised and the
bones thereof broken, and said mother greatly and grievously bruised,
hurt, jammed and wounded in her left hip, thigh, side and body."94 The
mother's baby was born four days after the accident with the left side of
his body damaged and paralyzed, among other injuries.95 The mother sued
as next friend on behalf of her son, the plaintiff.
9 6
The plaintiff cited Blackstone as authority in this case, stating that
"[l]ife is the immediate gift of God-a right inherent by nature in every
individual; and it begins, in contemplation of law, as soon as the infant is
able to stir in its mother's womb. 97 The metaphor employed here, that
life is a gift from God, does not offer any clear guidance as to the status
of the fetus.98 Gifts are often inanimate objects, although sometimes they
may be living creatures. When one gives something to another, there is
the notion that the recipient will have some control over the gift.
Hopefully, the recipient will cherish the gift and show the giver some kind
of gratitude. Also, giving a gift transfers ownership of the gift from one
party to another. Describing most objects in this fashion is
uncontroversial. But, once we describe living things (organs, fetuses) as
gifts, some problems arise. When an organ donor gives away his liver, he
91.1d.
92Alaire, 56 N.E. at 638.93 Id.
94 Id.
951d.96
Id.
9
'
7AIaire, 56 N.E. at 638.
98 d.
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has given away an organ that belonged to him. People will often refer to
organ donors as giving the gift of life. Blackstone's comment frames this
act in a theological perspective. The metaphor's imagery suggests that
God has extended this "gift" of life to an inanimate being (the fetus) which
is then the recipient of this gift. The parents are considered the steward,
rather than the owners, of this gift. This language suggests that before
quickening, the fetus may be viewed as only an appendage, but
afterwards, it is imbued with a greater degree of moral status.
The plaintiff also cited the earlier Dietrich case. 9 But the Dietrich
court, as acknowledged by the Allaire court, stated that there had never
been a case where an injured infant had maintained an action for injuries
received in utero.100 The Allaire court echoed this view, stating "lt]hat a
child before birth is, in fact, a part of the mother and is only severed from
her at birth, cannot, we think, be successfully disputed."' 0' Moreover, the
court was not persuaded by the argument that the infant in utero is
sometimes regarded as in esse (in existence) for some purposes, such as
within the doctrine of civil law and the ecclesiastical and admiralty
courts."' In this court's eyes, the common law had never recognized an
infant's standing for injuries received before birth.0 3
The absence of any precedent did not trouble the dissent in this case
as much as the majority."° The dissent of Justice Boggs acknowledged
that under common law, the fetus was considered to be part of the mother,
and that an injury to it was an injury to the mother and no more.105 The
dissent argued that once the fetus had reached a certain point of viability,
there were, in fact, two lives and not just one.' And if that fetus was
injured and then born live with that injury, "is it not sacrificing the truth
to a mere theoretical abstraction to say the injury was not to the child but
wholly to the mother."'10 7
The dissent also cited Blackstone, who offered the following
pronouncement regarding life:
9Id.
1 Id.
1011d.
1
'2Allaire, 56 N.E. at 640.
103Id.
" Id. at 640-41.
.
1 Id. at 641-42.
1
°Allaire, 56 N.E. at 641.
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The right of personal security consists in a person's legal and
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health
and his reputation .... For if a woman is quick with child, and by
a potion or otherwise killeth it in her womb, or if any one beat her,
whereby the child dieth in her body and she is delivered of a dead
child, this, though not murder, was by the ancient law homicide or
manslaughter.' 8
In his dissent, Boggs addressed the differences in how the common law
treated the intentional killing of a fetus. 10 9 For instance, the intentional
killing of a fetus that is stillborn was considered manslaughter.' 10 On the
other hand, if the fetus was born live, even fleetingly, and then died, the
common law treated the act as murder."' Boggs argued that if the
quickened child canbe murdered, then why deny it the opportunity to later
sue for prenatal injuries?' 2 Essentially, Boggs argued that if a fetus in
utero is viable, it should have the ability to later sue for prenatal
injuries."13
The dissent offered one of the earliest challenges to the traditional
common law view of the in utero fetus as a nonentity, legally speaking."
4
By viewing the fetus as a separate entity, Boggs framed the status of the
fetus differently." 5 The murder statute's metaphor of the fetus as a
potential victim persuaded Boggs to challenge the common law's
traditional refusal to grarqt standing to the child who suffered injuries as
a fetus." 6 Framing the fetus as part of the mother made it much easier for
judges to dismiss any tort rights the child qua fetus might possess." 7 But
Boggs found the inconsistency between the criminal and civil law to be
too glaring to ignore." 8
In the 1913 New York case of Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights Railroad
Co.," 9 Judge Thomas wrote a rather cumbersome opinion regarding
'
031d.
09Id.
"1d.
1111d. at 641.
"
2Allaire, 56 N.E. at 641.
13Id.
141d. at 641-42.
"sId.
1 161d..
"'Allaire, 56 N.E. at 641-42.
181d.
"Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co, 139 N.Y.S. 367 (1913).
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injuries sustained by a fetus in utero. 2 ° Here, the late-term fetus was
injured about a month before delivery.121 In trying to determine whether
the fetus had standing to sue for its injuries, the court assessed the status
of the fetus. 122 The court acknowledged that one argument contends that
only uponbirth does the infantbecome a rights-bearing entity, abeing that
can possess property, for instance. 123 In his opinion, however, Judge
Thomas argued that even before birth, fetuses have the ability to receive
property; only after birth are they able to enjoy it.124 Thomas cited the
language of an earlier case, which in turn cited the language of yet another
even earlier case:
Let us see what this nonentity can do. He may be vouched in a
recovery, though it is for the purpose of maldng him answer over
in value. He may be an executor. He may take under the Statute
of Distributions. He may take by devise. He may be entitled under
a charge for raising portions. He may have an injunction, and he
may have a guardian."
Moreover, Thomas acknowledged that the intentional killing ofan unborn
child is considered murder and that an unborn child has the same remedies
regarding property interests as a human owner.126 Nonetheless, Thomas
examined the nature of the duty owed by the defendant in this case to the
unborn infant.127 Although the carrier had a duty to act reasonably toward
the mother (as well as to a born, yet concealed infant), the carrier had no
duty to the concealed, unborn infant. 128
In its opinion, the court seemed sympathetic to some of the views
espoused by Justice Boggs in his dissent in Allaire. 29 The fetus occupied
this strange role where it could possess property rights, be victimized by
a murderer, and yet could not later sue for negligently inflicted prenatal
1 
z°Id.
1211d. at 368.
'221d. at 369.1231d.
124Nugent, 139 N.Y.S. at 369.
"Id. (citing Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves., Jr. 227, 321, 322, cited in Walker v. Grit
Northern R. Co., 28 L.R. I. 69, 175 (1891)).
"
6Id. at 370.
1271d. at 371.
'RId.
"
1 Id. at 372.
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injuries.13' For Thomas, however, the crucial question was the
relationship between the defendant in this case and the plaintiff infant.'3
The simple question was, did the defendant owe a duty of care to the fetus
in utero?33 After acknowledging the "fictional" property rights a fetus
has, the court reasoned that since the fetus was not a passenger in its own
right (as would be abom infant), the defendant had no duty of care to it. '
Thus, the defendant had a duty of care toward the mother, but not the
dependent fetus residing within the mother's uterus.
34
This case slightly eroded the appendage metaphor. Judge Thomas
recognized that the fetus had some distinct identity, separate from the
mother.135 It seemed inconsistent that a fetus could be the victim of
murder or manslaughter (suggesting a separate identity) and yet could not
later sue for prenatal damages.136 Yet, in the end, the appendage metaphor
won the day. 137 The court ruled that the defendant did not owe any duty
to the late-term fetus.' 38 This is a rather strange conclusion, especially
when we consider that the defendant in this case would have owed a duty
to a concealed infant. It seems odd that the defendant would have a duty
to a week-old newborn, but would not have any duty of care to a late-term
fetus a week before delivery. For Thomas, the literal expulsion of the
fetus from the uterus and out into the world is understood both
metaphorically and existentially as a significant event. 39 Not only does
the fetus perform new physical activities (such as breathing) but now the
law attaches a great deal of importance to the event. 40 Legally, the
infant's age starts at birth.' 4' Although it could be the victim of an
intentional crime, such as murder, before birth, it could now finally be a
plaintiff in a tort action. 142 So, the fetus slips between being a potential
'"Nugent, 139 N.Y.S. at 372.
"'Id. at 371.
321d.
'33Id.
1341d.
13"Nugent, 139 N.Y.S. at 372.
'6id.
1371d.
13 Id. at 371.
139Id
"'4Nugent, 139 N.Y.S. at 372.
'4Id.
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victim of murder if framed within the lens of criminal law to the status of
an appendage if it is framed within tort law.1
43
In the 1921 New York case of Drobner v. Peters,1 Judge Pound
gave the majority opinion. 145 Here, a pregnant woman fell into a coalhole
that was in front of the defendant's property. 41 The mother sued on
behalf of the infant, who was born eleven days after the accident. 47 The
court noted that the vast majority ofjudicial cases did not believe that the
child could maintain a negligence action for injuries sustained while in
utero.148 The court also noted that the law imputes a legal fiction upon the
fetus in utero, giving it certain property rights. 49  Moreover, the law
severely penalizes the intentional killing of a quickened fetus.'. But, as
the majority stated:
Rights of ownership of property do not connote a duty ofpersonal care to
the inchoate owner, nor does the crime of causing the death of an unborn child
connote liability to the child for personal injuries. When justice or convenience
requires, the child in the womb is dealt with as a human being, although
psychologically it is a part of the mother, but the law has been fairly well settled
during its centuries of growth against the beneficence of an artificial rule of
liability for personal injuries sustained by it.'s'
Ultimately, the court decided that the defendant owed no duty of care to
the fetus, stating that the fetus was part of the mother.'2 This cautious
decision reflects a concern forjudicial legislation, even though "sympathy
and natural justice" may suggest a cause of action in this case. 3
In addition to the traditional appendage metaphor, Judge Pound
offered a new cipher metaphor.' 5 As a cipher, the fetus has no inherent
status, but only what is conferred upon it.'5 The conception of the fetus's
1431d.
'"Drobner v. Peters, 133 N.E 567 (N.Y. 1921).
1451d. at 567.
146id.
1471d.
143See Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 56 N.E. 638 (Ill. 1990); Walker v. Great Northern Ry.
Co., 28 L. R. Ir. 69 (Q.B. 1891); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 I. 169 (1901); Bud v. United Rys. Co.,
154 SAV. 71 (Mo. 1913); Lipps v. Milwaukee El. Ry. & L. Co. 164 Wis. 272 (1916).
14'Drobner v. Peters, 133 N.E. 567, 568 (N.Y. 1921).
'sold.
1511d.
152Id.
S 3 I d .
'UDrobner, 133 N.E. at 568.SId at 224.
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status has a malleable, chameleon-like quality to it. 5 6 As the court stated,
if something benefits the fetus, it is treated as if it has some rights. 5 7 Yet,
the court failed to challenge the traditional inconsistency of criminalizing
feticide but not permitting children to recover damages suffered
prenatally.1 58
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have discussed the fluidity of
categorization in their work Metaphors We Live By.'59 They have argued
that categories are not fixed concepts, "but may be narrowed, expanded,
or adjusted relative to our purposes and other contextual factors."' 60
Similarly, the category of fetus may be shaped according to our own
purposes. As Judge Pound asserted in Drobner, the fetus may be vested
with certain future property rights, if such a vesting benefits the fetus.'
6
'
Yet, a fetus may not have the right to sue for injuries suffered while in
utero, for other policy considerations.' 62
Drobner v. Peters was decided in 1921.163 Fourteen years later, the
Supreme Court of Texas addressed a similar case in Magnolia Coca Cola
Bottling Co. v. Jordan.64 Here, the defendant ran his truck into Mrs.
Jordan, who was pregnant at the time. 65 She later prematurely delivered
twin babies, one of whom died.' 66 The plaintiff lost at the trial level
because the law did not recognize a cause of action to recover damages for
prenatal injuries. 67 The court found no guiding authority to permit a child
to recover for prenatal injuries. 16 The court cited Holmes's famous ruling
in Dietrich, as well as the holding in the well-known Irish case, Walker v.
Great Northern Ry. Co. oflreland169 Two of the justices in Walker held
that "a fetus in utero is not a person in esse . not a person, or a
"S7Id.
IS7 Id.
1581d.
15 9LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 164.
16Old.
16'Drobner v. Peters, 133 N.E. 567, 568 (N.Y. 1921).
'
621d. at 571.
1631d. at 568.
'"Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 78 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1935).
16S1d, at 944.
166Id.
16Id.
6id.
16 alker v. Great Northern Ry. Co. of Ireland, 28 L. R. Ir. 69 (Q.B. 1891).
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passenger, or a human being. Her age and existence are reckoned from
birth. 1
70
The court was highly persuaded by the prevailing legal authority that
stated that life begins at birth and not at an earlier time.171 Justice
Smedley, writing for the majority, acknowledged the dissents in such
cases as Allaire, which argued for recognizing a cause of action for the
negligent infliction of prenatal injuries." Although Smedley
acknowledged greater medical knowledge that suggests that the fetus has
a certain status, he succumbed to practicality. 7 3 For the court, the birth
event provided an easy and clear demarcation between living and non-
living. 74 The court believed that trying to determine when exactly a
person owed a certain duty of care to an unborn child would be fraught
with difficulties. 75 Neither medical nor scientific evidence of the separate
existence of the unborn child supposedly aided the law in trying to
determine a bright line between when a person owed a duty to the fetus
and when he did not. 76 Only birth, in the court's opinion, provided this
line.177 Moreover, the court was concerned with not only the speculation
of scientific and medical testimony with regards to viability, but also with
the perceived onslaught of false claims. 78
The court's metaphor of birth event suggests that the fetus is
following a purposeful path. As Mark Johnson has noted, the location
version of the event structure metaphor suggests a motion along a path
toward some destination. 179 Although what the fetus has done literally is
merely move from an enclosed womb to breathing air, metaphorically this
transition has greater significance. The fetus has emerged from a world
where some rights attach, but others do not, to a world where it has many
(but not all) of the rights of an adult.'8 0
1701d.
1'7 Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).172d. at 945.17id.
1741d.
'"-ld. at 949.
176Magnolia, 78 S.W.2d at 949.
1 Id. at 948.
17id. at 949.79JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 37.19DOld
"
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Birth as the Defining Event: Criminal Cases
A number of cases have held that the killing of an unborn fetus is not
homicide.' The 1872 New York case of Evans v. People'82 captured
nineteenth century views toward fetal death:
Causing the death of an infant in the mother's womb was at a very
early day deemed murder; but it is not so regarded at the common
law at the present time, and is not made so by statute. Such an
infant is not considered a person or human being upon whom the
crime of murder can be committed .... There must be a living child
before its death can be produced. It is not the destruction of the
foetus, the interruption of the process by which the human race is
propagated and continued, that is punishable by the statute as
manslaughter, but it is causing the death of a living child.' 3
In Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County,'84 the California
Supreme Court examined the question as to whether an unborn but viable
fetus is a human being.'85 In this case, a divorced husband severely beat
his pregnant ex-wife with such force that her fetus' skull was fractured.'86
The fetus was delivered stillborn.' 87 The fetus at the time of its death was
thirty-five weeks.188 The California statute in question stated that "murder
is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought."'189 In
trying to determine whether an infant could be the subject of a homicide
action, Justice Mosk looked to the pronouncements of Lord Coke:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by potion or otherwise killeth
it in her wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dyeth in
her body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great
1'8 See, e.g., Abrams v. Foshee, 3 Iowa 274 (1856); Clarke v. State, 23 So. 671 (Ala. 1898);
Morgan v. State, 256 S.W. 433 (Tenn. 1923); Passley v. State, 21 S.E.2d 230 (Ga. 1942); Keeler
v. Superior Ct. ofAmador County, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970); Meadows v. State, 722 S.W.2d 584
(Ark. 1987); State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1989); People v. Ehlert, 654 N.E.2d 705 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1995).
'Evans v. People, 49 N.Y. 86, 88-90 (1872).
13Id.
8Keeler v. Superior Ct. of Amador County, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
"1.1d. at 619.
186Id.
"
71d. at 624.
18 id.
"'Keeler, 470 P.2d at 617.
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misprision, and no murder; but if the childe be born alive dyeth of
the potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder;, for in law it is
accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum natura, when it is born
alive. 9°
Coke spoke metaphorically about the newborn child when he called it a
"reasonable creature."'1 9 In fact, it was probably no more a reasonable
creature when newly born than a few hours before delivery. 92 To say that
the fetus has the potential to become a reasonable creature suggests the
location version of the event structure metaphor. 93 The fetus is moving
along (metaphorically) from a place where it is devoid of reason to a place
where it eventually will be equipped with reason.'94 Again, birth is treated
as an almost mystical event that confers upon the infant a whole host of
newly acquired rights. 195
Judge Mosk, in his majority opinion, briefly reviewed thejudgments
of a series of English court decisions in the 19th century.' In general,
these decisions stated that an infant had to first be born alive before the
crime of murder could be charged. 97 Although issues such as breathing
and the cutting of the umbilical cord were considered to be significant
events, there seemed to be a consensus of opinion regarding live birth as
somehow conferring "human being" status to a fetusInewborn. 93 This
kind of view prevailed until the mid-nineteenth century when some state
legislatures, such as New York, modified the common law of abortion. 1s)
The new law criminalized the killing of "an unborn quick child" as
manslaughter.2 00 The court also cited an 1856 case from Iowa that
declared that "an infant en ventre sa mere is not a human being' (again
citing Coke along with Blackstone) within the meaning of the then-
existing homicide statute.0 1
1 Id. at 624.
19 Id19Id.
193Id.
'94Keeler, 470 P.2d at 624.
1'9sd.
196Id.
197Id.
1981d.
""Keeler, 470 P.2d at 624.
"&:Id2
'Id. at 629. En ventre sa mere-"in the womb of one's mother." STEmVL- H. GIns, LAW
DIcTIONARY (New York: Barron's, 1984).
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The court further noted the language of the California Code
Commission, which concluded that "[a] child within its mother's womb
is not a 'human being' within the meaning of that term as used in defining
murder. The rule is that it must be born. 20 2 The court also believed that
Chavez proposed that a viable fetus in the process of being born was a
human being.20 3 In its view, however, a viable fetus not completely born
is not a human being.2 4 Again, live birth is invested with a great deal of
legal importance.
The court also asserted that the common law never recognized the
fetus as a human being within the traditional meaning of murder.20 5
Statutory law, however, as reflected through feticide statutes, has equated
the fetus with a human being.20 6 On the other hand, the dissent noted that
under common law, the quickened child was considered to be a separate
human being.20 7 The dissent quoted Blackstone's metaphor of life as gift:
"Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every
individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is
able to stir in the mother's womb." 28 Thus, the dissent argued that killing
a quickened child was a severely punishable offense, and not something
that was treated leniently.2 9 Moreover, the dissent noted that the common
law presumed that injured fetuses would be born dead; this presumption
discouraged viewing the killing of a viable fetus as a homicide.1 0
The 1974 case The People v. Carlson21' made explicit the metaphor
of fetus as murder victim. 21 2 Here, a California appeals court addressed
the issue of manslaughter and the status of the fetus. 213 The defendant was
convicted of manslaughter in killing his pregnant wife and the question
was whether the defendant was guilty of the second degree murder of the
fetus under the felony-murder rule.2 4 The court cited the Keeler case as
2
'2Keeler, 470 P.2d at 630.203Id.
2
°4Id.
2051d.206Id. at 640.
207Keeler, 470 P.2d at 640.2081d.209Id
"
2 l1d. at 643.21
'People v. Carlson, 37 Cal. App. 3d 349, 355 (1974).212id.
214Id.2"4id
"
[Vol. 2:703
METAPHORICAL IMAGINATION: FETUSES & EMBRYOS
authority and noted that the statute relied upon in that case stated that
murder was the unlawful killing of a human being.215 The legislature,
however, quickly amended the law to state that murder was the unlawful
killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.21 6 But, it
neglected to amend the language of the manslaughter statute, which
limited itself to human beings.217
Reyes v. Superior Court of San Bernardino2 8 exemplified the
metaphor of fetus as potential abuse victim.219 This case dealt with
interpreting the language of a statute criminalizing endangerment of a
child.22' Here, an expectant mother used heroin in the last two months of
her pregnancy.221 The term "child" in the statute posed some problems for
the court.' The court looked to differing punishments for aborting a
fetus as compared to endangering a fetus, as well as to explicit statutory
language protecting unborn life.223 Accordingly, the court made the
following statement: "[W]hen the Legislature determines to confer legal
responsibility on unborn fetuses for certain limited purposes, it expresses
in specific and appropriate terms . . . when the Legislature speaks
generally of a person... it plainly excludes fetuses." 2 4
Viability as the Defining Event
Despite this line of cases that viewed fetuses as non-persons (often citing
common law as authority), there was a growing judicial trend that was
challenging these traditional views and deferring more to growing
scientific and medical evidence. One of the first cases that accorded a
greater level of status to a late-term fetus was the 1939 California case of
Scott v. McPheeters.2 2 In this case, a physician used metal clamps and
forceps to extract a newborn child from the uterus.226 This procedure
caused serious injury to the brain and spine, resulting in permanent
2 SId.
216Carlson, 37 Cal. App. 3d at 355.2171d.
"'Reyes v. Superior Ct., 75 Cal. App. 3d 214 (App. Ct. 1977).
2191d.
mOld.
2'Id.
mid.
'Reyes, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 220.
224 d.
"Scott v. McPheeters, 92 P.2d 678 (Cal. App. Ct. 1939).22Id. at 679.
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paralysis in the child.227 Again, the issue was whether a child could
maintain an action for injuries sustained while in utero.228 Here, the
California appeals court relied on medical and scientific authority.29 The
majority opinion cited the dissent of Justice Boggs in the earlier Illinois
Supreme Court case ofAllaire.230 The court noted that a seven-month old
fetus could often live independently of its mother ifit happened to be born
prematurely.23' "Who may say that such a viable child is not in fact a
human being in actual existence?"2 32 The court viewed the authority of
precedents pragmatically; they "are valuable so long as they do not
obstruct justice or destroy progress." 233 Moreover, the court relied on the
dissenting opinions of earlier cases that argued for treating unborn fetuses
as having interests equivalent to living children.2 34 As the court stated at
the end of its opinion, "[t]he fact that this reasoning occurs in a dissenting
opinion, which does not controvert the decision of the court in any respect,
does not detract from its logical value."2 35 The majority's opinion was one
of the earliest legal opinions to challenge prevailing legal authority while
deferring to new medical and scientific facts regarding the status of the
fetus.236 The court challenged the old appendage metaphor, insisting that
the late-term fetus was a unique and separate being, apart from the
mother.237  Although this was not an entirely novel view, it was a
departure from traditional views of the fetus in negligence law.238
Another landmark medical malpractice case that successfully
challenged prevailing common law regarding the status of the fetus was
Bonbrest v. Kot, 239 decided in 1946.240 Here, the court reviewed a case
whereby a fetus was killed in utero due to medical malpractice. 24' The
27Id.
='Id.
2291d.
23Scott, 92 P.2d at 681.
2'id.
2321d. at 682.
"I3 d. at 683.
2 4Id.
235Scott, 92 P.2d at 684.
27Id.7Id.
238Id.
29 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. D.C. 1946).240[d.
2411d
"
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father filed a suit as next fiend on behalf of his child. 242 Judge McGuire,
in delivering the majority opinion, noted that traditionally in the absence
of statute, there could be no action in tort for a prenatal injury.2 43 The
court noted that the underlying assumption was that "a child en ventre sa
mere has no juridical existence." 244
This assumption was formalized by Oliver Wendell Holmes in
Dietrich.245 In Dietrich, Holmes made no distinction between the mother
and her fetus in utero; in his eyes "the unborn child was a part of the
mother at the time of injury."2 46 For Judge McGuire, on the other hand,
there was a real distinction to be drawn between the two cases.2 47 Most
important was the fact that the fetus in utero was injured by an outside
party and not injured by some means transmitted through the mother 43
The court responded forcefully to Holmes's question as to whether
viability was an issue or not.249 In Bonbrest, the fetus was viable; for this
court, calling a viable fetus a part of the mother was contradictory.
2s
Because the fetus was capable of life outside of the mother, it was not
"part" of the mother in any really meaningful sense. 2  The court
questioned the distinction different areas of the law made regarding the
status of the fetus. 2  For instance, under criminal and property law, a
child en ventre sa mere (in the mother's womb) was considered to be a
humanbeing.2 3 On the other hand, negligence theory considered the fetus
to be part of the mother and not a distinct entity.2 As the court stated, "It
has, if viable, its own bodily form and members, manifests all of the
anatomical characteristics of individuality, possesses its own circulatory,
vascular and excretory systems and is capable now of being ushered into
the visible world.' 2
5
2421d.
243Id.
2"Bonbresto 65 F. Supp. at 140.
245Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).2461d. at 17.247Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D. D.C. 1946).
2481d.
2491d.
250Id.
2511d.
'2Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 141.
Z3Id
24Id.
25 id.
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The court, in making its claim that an injured fetus may later have
standing to sue for damages, looked to the Supreme Court of Canada for
guidance. 6 It found the logic of the Court's reasoning to be unassailable:
If a child after birth has no right of action for prenatal injuries, we
have a wrong inflicted for which there is no remedy, for, although
the father my be entitled to compensation for the loss he has
incurred and the mother for what she has suffered, yet there is a
residuum of injury for which compensation cannot be had save at
the suit of the child. If a right of action be denied to the child it
will be compelled, without any fault on its part, to go through life
carrying the seal of another's fault and bearing a very heavy burden
ofinfirmity and inconvenience without any compensation therefor.
To my mind it is but natural justice that a child, if born alive and
viable should be allowed to maintain an action in the courts for
injuries wrongfully committed upon its person while in the womb
of its mother.5 7
The court's metaphor of the fetus as a little person has some merit.2 8 The
majority is correct in claiming that the developed, viable fetus possesses
a distinct circulatory system, and has the physical features characteristic
of small children.259 Therefore, it stretches credulity to believe that the
fetus is "merely" part of the mother.260 Moreover, the court was
concerned not only with the status of the fetus, but also about being just
to the harmed child who possesses no recourse for compensation due to
fetal injuries.26' The court in Bonbrest provided yet more judicial
ammunition for proponents of the fetus-as-distinct-entity metaphorical
view.
A case that arose soon after Bonbrest was People v. Chavez.6 2 This
case involved a young woman who was convicted of manslaughter in
connection with the death of her newborn child.263 The fifty-year-old case
2561d.
'2'Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 141.258d.259Id.
2601d.
2611d.
262People v. Chavez, 176 P.2d 92 (Cal. App. Ct. 1947).2611d. at 92.
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echoes several contemporary infanticide cases.264 In his majority opinion,
Judge Barnard noted that under the common law of homicide, a newborn
would have to be born alive and completely separated from its mother.265
The court also noted the difficulty with which one could ascribe
humanhood to a newborn: "[t]he mere removal of the baby in such a case
or its birth in a normal case does not, of itself and alone, create a human
being."266 The court's view was that a newborn is a human being,
regardless as to whether the birth process had been completed. 7 Judge
Bamard was critical of the prevailing assumption that a child is not a
human being unless fully born, noting that the child during delivery is
fully viable and is capable of existence outside of its mother 2 3 The
court's opinion was yet another challenge to the traditional view of birth
as the bright line for humanhood, rather than viability.
A slightly later case that held a fetus to be a "person" was the 1949
case of Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit.269 In this case, Ruth Williams
was pregnant and riding on one of the defendant's buses270 She fell while
getting off the bus, suffering injuries that caused her child to be born
prematurely.27 ' The child also was injured, suffering from a number of
maladies.27- Again, the question here was whether the child could sue for
prenatal injuries, and thus whether the fetus was a person in the eyes of the
law.273 The court cited a section from American Jurisprudence:
It is a general rule of law that in the absence of a statutory
provision requiring a different result, a prenatal injury affords no
basis for an action in damages in favor of the child. The doctrine
of the civil law and the ecclesiastical and admiralty courts that an
unborn child may be regarded as in esse for some purposes, when
for its benefit, has been characterized as a legal fiction not indulged
2Id.
'6'Id. at 94.26
'id.
' Chavez, 176 P.2d at 96.
26Sd.
"WXVilliams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 87 N.E.2d 334, 335 (Ohio 1949).
2701d. at 335.
2711d.
2
'The case described the child as "born suffering with heart trouble, and ever since herbirth
has been anemic and has had spasms, and she has been always, and still is, unable to ,alk and talk
as does a normal person and is in a highly nervous condition; that she is permanently and
incurably crippled and will be unable to make a normal gainful living through her lifetime." Id.
273Id.
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in by the courts to the extent of allowing an action by an infant for
injuries occasioned before its birth. A reason advanced for this rule
is that there is no person in being at the time of the accident to
whom the defendant owes a duty of care. There is, however, some
difference of opinion on the question.274
The majority opinion noted that previous courts would preclude children
from suing for prenatal injuries because of the strength of stare decisis. 275
For the court, the ultimate question was whether the injured fetus was a
person under the meaning of Article 1, Section 16 of the United States
Constitution.27 6 The court concluded that at the time of injury, the fetus
was viable, and "so far matured that... the death of the mother could not
have deprived it of life.' 2 77 The court ultimately held that viewing the
viable fetus as part of the mother was an unjustified fiction not based on
fact.
278
Another case that deferred to growing medical authority was Smith
v. Brennan. 79 Here, an infant sued for injuries sustained in a car accident
while in utero.280 Sean Smith, the plaintiff, was born with leg and feet
deformities.28' The state of New Jersey at the time did not recognize a
cause of action for prenatal injuries.2 82 The New Jersey Supreme Court
stated in dicta that courts at the time disagreed with the theory that a fetus
was part of the mother, but rather that the infant's existence separate from
the mother began before birth.283 The court went on to state that criminal
law treated the unborn child as a separate entity, and that property law
accords him status "forpurposes beneficial to his interests.2 84 Moreover,
aposthumous child may recover as a dependent of his deceased father (the
thinking being that a child is both a "child in esse" at the time of his
father's death and a "posthumous child" when born); an infant child may
274Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 87 N.E.2d 334, 335 (1949) (citing 52 AM. JUR. 440
§ 98). 2751d. at 336.
2761d. at 335.2
"Id. at 340.
2781d.
279Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960).
2"0Id. at 498.
28Id.
282Id.
2"Id. at 502.
2uSmith, 157 A.2d at 502.
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bring an action for wrongful death of its father which occurred before its
death.28
5
The court deferred to existing medical authority by stating "that
medical authorities recognize that before birth an infant is a distinct
entity."286 The court dismissed the issue as to whether the fetus is aperson
as "beside the point" because the fetus will indeed become a person (if
normal development occurs) when born, and that person will suffer harms
due to injuries it received as a fetus.2 7 The court finally noted that no
court that allowed recovery for an injury to a viable fetus also denied
recovery to a child because it survived an injury before it was viable.2: 3
Therefore, the majority found the viability rule to be of little value?2 9 In
its view, if a child sustains a harm from an injury suffered while in utero
as a fetus, it makes little difference whether the fetus was viable or not.2
Later cases, such as Procanik v. C1 29' addressed the issue of
"wrongful life."2 92 In this case, the infant plaintiff claimed that the
defendant physicians negligently failed to diagnose German measles in his
mother.2 93 Having been born with congenital rubella syndrome, the
plaintiff claimed his parents were deprived of the opportunity to abort him
during gestation.294 The court found that the defendants owed a duty to
the infant in this case.295 The court's language suggested that the infant
may have suffered a harm, whereas the fetus that became the infant was
only injured.296 This raises the important distinction between injuries and
harms that Judge Proctor alluded to in Smith v. Brennan. 97 It seems that
only creatures that have interests can be harmed, whereas non-interest-
bearing creatures may be injured but not harmed (trees for instance).: 3
The court in this case limited its inquiry into the harm suffered by the
2Id.
2"Id. at 503.
'-mId.
2'Id. at 504.
2'9Smith, 157 A.2d at 504.
2931d.
29Proeanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984).
-1Id.
2931d. at 757.
29Id. at 760.
2
'SId. at 760-64.
2"See Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497,499 (N.J. 1960).
27Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 761 (N.J. 1984).
2RId. at 763.
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plaintiffinfant and the injury suffered by his preceding fetal life.299 At one
point, the court quotes itself, waxing metaphorically about the harms
suffered by one member of a family:
The foreseeability of injury to members of a family other than one
immediately injured by the wrongdoing of another must be viewed
in light of the legal relationships among family members. A family
is woven of the fibers of life; if one strand is damaged, the whole
structure may suffer. The filaments of family life, although
individually spun, create a web of interconnected legal interests.
This Court has recognized that a wrongdoer who causes a direct
injury to one member of the family may indirectly damage
another."0
The metaphor that a family is a web suggests the interconnectedness as
well as the fragility of that organization. Conversely, the court could have
described the "chain links" of family life rather than filaments. Filaments
suggest something easily broken, whereas links convey something much
harder to break. Moreover, the implicit metaphor is that each family
member is an individual spider, spinning his or her own web. Each of
these webs interconnect, creating an even larger web. Thus, each family
member feels any damage done to any part of the web, regardless of its
origin. Moreover, this passage raises the issue as to whose interests have
been undermined. It seems that the court is focusing its inquiry on the
harms suffered by the infant, and not the injury suffered by the fetus.
The issue of whether a fetus is a person was again addressed in the
1991 case Johnson v. State of Florida.3"' This was the first time a
prosecutor successfully prosecuted a pregnant woman for prenatal damage
to a fetus.30 2 In the appellate case, Jennifer Clarise Johnson was appealing
two prior convictions of delivering controlled substances to a minor.0 3
While pregnant, Johnson ingested cocaine, knowing this would pass to her
gestating fetus.3 4 The applicable Florida statute read:
2 Id.
3°Id. at 762-63 (quoting Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 839 (N.J. 198 1)).
3
'Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).3
°2julia Epstein, The Sacred Body in Law and Literature: The Pregnant Imagination, Fetal
Rights, and Women's Bodies: A Historical Inquiry, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 139, 141 (1995).
303Johnson, 578 So. 2d at 419.
304id.
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[I]t is unlawful for any person 18 years of age or older to deliver
any controlled substance to a person under the age of 18 years, or
to use or hire a person under the age of 18 years as an agent or
employee in the sale or delivery of such a substance, or to use such
person to assist in avoiding detection or apprehension for a
violation of this chapter.3"5
Judge Cobb, concurring with the majority opinion of the court, stated that
when Johnson ingested cocaine and passed it along to her child, the
"infants were 'persons."' 3 5 Cobb made the claim that the cocaine was
transmitted when the infants were newly born, and not when they were
still in utero. °7 Moreover, he claimed that although Florida law does not
criminalize transmission of cocaine to a fetus, it does criminalize
transmission of cocaine from one person to another.30 3 Johnson used
cocaine within forty-eight hours of delivering her baby, and therefore
Cobb surmised that she had the necessary intent of transmitting cocaine
to a live person, and not just a fetus in utero.09
As Judge Sharp elaborated inhis dissenting opinion, the transmission
time was limited to the moment the baby was fully delivered from the
mother's vaginal canal to the moment the baby's umbilical cord was cut,
roughly sixty to ninety seconds.311 Sharp, however, challenged the view
that cocaine was delivered from mother to infant in that minute and a
half.3  He stated that the blood that flowed through the umbilical cord
was the child's and not part of the mother's body.
In 1992, the Supreme Court overturned the lower court's decision.
By the early 1990s, nearly 200 women had been prosecuted for drug use
during pregnancy.314 Although many pleaded guilty, the ones who have
3051d. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13 (1)(c)).
1"tId. at 420.
307Id. at 420-21.
"'Johnson v. State, 578 So.2d 419, 420-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
" 'Judge Cobb mentions that there was even some evidence thatJohnson used cocainevwhile
in labor, further supporting his view that Johnson had the necessary intent. Id.
310Id. at 421.
311d.
'2id. at 422.
3'Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
3"'AngelaL. Knutson, South Carolina Supreme Court Sendsthe IVrongMessage: IfYouAre
Pregnant andAddicted Tell Your Doctor and You Will Go to Jail, 20 HAilJNzE L. REV. 207,203
(1996) (citing Lynn M. Paltrow, Criminal Prosecutions Against Women: National Update and
Overview (1992)).
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challenged their prosecutions have been successful. 3' 5 Dorothy Roberts
has argued that "[t]hese women are not punished simply because they may
harm their unborn children. They are punished because the combination
of their poverty, race, and drug addiction is seen to make them unworthy
of procreating. 3
16
Johnson not only exemplifies the venerable person metaphor of the
fetus, but also introduces a new metaphor-that of an adversary. As
Epstein has noted:
[s]uch prosecutions necessarily vest fetuses with the status of
persons whose rights can be asserted against the rights of their
mothers, thereby interpreting an adversarial relation between
pregnant women and their fetuses. The legal notions of fetal
personhood is relatively new in our legal discourse, and, ironically,
results in part from the 1973 United States Supreme Court decision
on abortion in Roe v. Wade.317
Roe v. Wade Influence
Most of the previous cases addressed the status of the fetus vis-A-vis its
standing to sue for prenatal injuries, although some focused on its status
within a criminal context. This question of the fetus's legal status
persisted as an issue in the long line of well-known abortion cases of the
last quarter century. Starting with Roe v. Wade,311 the Court looked to a
variety of sources to determine the status of the fetus.319 Justice
Blackmun's majority opinion in Roe looked to ancient attitudes, the
Hippocratic oath, common law, English statutory law, American law, the
American Medical Association, as well as the American Public Health
Association and the American Bar Association for guidance on this
topic. 320 The majority concluded that ancient authorities held liberal
attitudes toward abortion, with the exception of the Pythagoreans. 321 By
the early Middle Ages, however, Christian sensibilities toward the unborn
3'51d.; see also Epstein, supra note 38, at 141.
"
6Dorothy Roberts, PunishingDrugAddicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality,
and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1472 (1991).
3 "Epstein, supra note 38, at 142.
31Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130 (1973).
"'ld. at 132-57.
'2Oid.
3211d.
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coincided with the ancient views of the Pythagoreans.3 Augustine
distinguished between the embryo inamatus (soulless embryo) and embryo
animatus (ensouled embryo).3  Aquinas developed his 40/80 day
distinction for male and female formation. 324  And early British
commentators such as Blackstone and Coke made distinctions based on
quickening. 32 Blackmun noted the confusion surrounding Coke's
pronouncements that the killing of a quickened child is "a great
misprision, and no murder.'3 26 Although many American courts followed
the rule that the killing of an unquickened fetus was not criminal, others
went further and held that the killing of even a quickened child was not
murder but rather a great misdemeanor ("misprision")? 27
The court also acknowledged English statutory law that preserved the
quickening distinction in the nineteenth century.328 The American
common law received the English common law; for instance, Connecticut
criminalized abortion before quickening in 1860.32- New York more
severely punished the killing of a quickened fetus .33  Although the
quickening distinction was preserved throughout the first half of the 19th
century, by the end of the century, the distinction disappeared and
penalties increased. 33 1 By the 20th century, almost all jurisdictions
prohibited abortion, except to save the life of the mother.33 2
In the 19th century, the American Medical Association (AMA)
wanted to expose the fallacy that a fetus was not alive until quickening.3 3
In 1859, the AMA pointed to the inconsistency with which the law treated
the fetus in utero: rights-bearing for civil purposes yet a non-entity for
criminal protection.3 4 The major challenge in the 20th century was to
recognize some sort of civil status for the fetus when injured prenatally.3 35
3"Id. at 132.
3'Roe, 410 U.S. at 134.
41d. (this distinction stated that ensoulment occurred after 40 days ofdevelopmcnt for a
male fetus and 80 days for a female fetus).
32I.
3z61d. at 135.
327Id. at 136.
3"Roe, 410 U.S. at 138.
32Id
3 3Id
"311d. at 139.
332Id. at 140.
333Roe, 410 U.S. at 141.
33Id
"33-Id. at 162.
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The law did impute a fictitious legal standing for property purposes, but
did not start to recognize the fetus as a being that could later sue for
damages. Of course, by that time, killing the unquickened fetus was a
criminal offense in nearly all American jurisdictions.336
It is interesting to note that no amicus brief of philosophers is cited
in the Roe decision. In the 1970s, a variety of American philosophers
were struggling with the status of fetal life, notably Michael Tooley, Mary
Anne Warren and Judith Jarvis Thompson.337 The Court primarily looked
to three major sources of authority for guidance on this issue: theological
writings, common law holdings, and medical findings.338 Contemporary
thinking on the matter by bioethicists and philosophers was noticeably
absent in the majority opinion. No criteria ofpersonhood, often debated
in the bioethics literature, was ever mentioned in the opinion.
With all of this information in mind, the Court did not view the fetus
to be a person within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution.339 The Court
acknowledged the differing views on the subject:
Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life
begins at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that,
therefore, the state has a compelling interest in protecting that life
from and after conception. We need not resolve the difficult
question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective
disciplines of medicine, philosophy and theology are unable to
arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the
development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate
as to the answer.34
Because of the inconsistent manner that the law has treated the unborn,
and because so many exceptions exist for the practice of abortion, the
Court was unconvinced that the fetus was a legal person.34' In fact, the
Court cited a long list of cases from the 1960s and 1970s that held a
'
361d. at 138.
337See Maijorie M. Schultz, Abortion and Maternal-Fetal Conflict: Broadening Our
Concerns, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN's STUD. 79 (1992).338Roe, 410 U.S. at 132-57.3391Id. at 159.
34°Id.
341id"
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similar view.342 Moreover, the Court noted the lack of consensus among
different disciplines regarding when lifebegan.343 Theological authorities
differed as to when human life began, common law believed quickening
was the significant event, and medical authorities focused on conception,
viability and live birth as significant defining events.4 Although the
Court dismissed the person metaphor, it was more persuaded by the
pathway metaphor.3 41 This metaphor of a path or line or continuum has
become a very attractive metaphor for both the courts and for academics
in describing the status of the fetus.
A case that was decided three years after Roe exemplified the
difference between the appendage metaphor and person metaphor. In
Commonwealth v. Edelin,46 Dr. Kenneth Edelin performed an abortion
by hysterotomy on a seventeen-year-old girl at Boston City Hospital.'
Dr. Edelin was indicted for the death of the fetus in this case. 3 The
Commonwealth prosecutor argued that when the fetus became detached
from the placenta, it became a person within the state's manslaughter
statute.349  The defense argued that this charge distorted the state's
manslaughter statute, not to mention avoiding the constitutionality of
Wade-Bolton.3" The defense concluded that the fetus had to emerge
completely from the mother's body before a charge ofmanslaughter could
attach.35 The trial court reasoned as follows:
A fetus is not a person, and not the subject of an indictment for
manslaughter. In order for a person to exist, he or she must be
born. Unborn persons, as I said, are not the subject of the crime of
manslaughter. Birth is the process which causes the emergence of
a new individual from the body of its mother. Once outside the
'
2SeegenerallyMcGarvey v. Magee-Women's Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. Pa 1972);
Bym v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887 (N.Y. 1972); Abele v. Marke,
351 F. Supp. 224 (D.C. Conn. 1972); Cheaney v. State, 285 N.E.2d at 270; Montana v. Rogers,
278 F.2d 68,72 (Cal. 1960), affd sub nor. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961); Keeler
v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970); State v. Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d 599 (Ohio 1971).
"
3Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
34Id. at 160.
NS1d
"
'"Commnonwealth v. Edelin, 359 N.E.2d 4, 24-25 (Mass. 1976).
'
71d. at 6.
3431d.
"Id.
3501d.
"
1Edelin, 359 N.E.2d at 24.
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body of its mother, the child has been born within the commonly
accepted meaning of that word.352
Unfortunately for Dr. Edelin, a unanimous jury found him guilty.353 He
was given a one-year probation, which was reversed by the Supreme
Judicial Court in 1976.354 Despite this turn of events, one commentator
noted that this conviction of a physician for manslaughter "sent shock
waves through the medical and legal communities."355  The person
metaphor was strongly conveyed to the jurors by images of the fetus. 356
A 1995 case, Farley v. Sartin,357 brought up the person metaphor yet
again.358 In this case, Cynthia Farley was pregnant anywhere from
eighteen weeks to twenty-two weeks. 359  Billy Sartin, the defendant,
collided into her car, killing both Cynthia and her fetus. 360 Cynthia's
husband, Kenneth, filed a wrongful death action on behalf of Cynthia's
fetus (referred to as "Baby Farley" throughout the majority opinion).36'
The defendants argued that Cynthia's fetus was not a person under the
wrongful death statutes, and thus there was no cause of action.362 The
court surveyed the history of wrongful death and prenatal torts, noting that
one popular view that denied recovery for the tortious death of a viable
unborn child was the "single entity" theory that was first raised in
Dietrich.363 This "single entity" theory is similar to the appendage
metaphor. The majority noted that medical science has disproved this
theory and it has been rejected by most jurisdictions. 3 4 Moreover, the
court observed that with the exception of Georgia and Missouri, no cases
3121d, at 24-25.
3531d.
3S54Id
35SMAYNARD-MOODY, supra note 1, at 68.3S6Conmonwealth v. Edelin, 359 N.E.2d 4124 (Mass. 1976); see also MAYNARD-MOODY,
supra note 1, at 68 (citing Barbara Culliton, Edelin Trial: Jury Not Persuaded by Scientistsfor the
Defense, Science 187 (1975)), ("The jurors reported that they were shaken by the photograph. 'It
looked like a baby,' Liberty Ann Conlin told reporters, '. . . it definitely had an effect on me.'
Paul Holland commented, 'The picture helped people draw their own conclusions. Everyone in
the room made up their minds that the fetus was a person."')).
"Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995)
...Id. at 522.3 91d. at 523.
360Id.
"Id. at 524.
362Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 530.
"'Id. at 533-34.
3641d.
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have allowed recovery for injury prior to viability unless there is a live
birth.65 The court concluded that an injustice is committed if a tortfeasor
is not punished because "the unborn child had not yet reached viability at
the time of death." '366
Interestingly, the majority stated that the definition of person within
the confines of wrongful death statutes does not run afoul of the definition
within abortion cases 6.3 7 The court cited one judge who stated:
The decision to allow abortion does not depend on the same
policies and justifications as does the decision to allow a cause of
action for the wrongful death of a fetus. While the fetus may not
be a 'person' for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment, it may
be a 'person' for the purposes of a state's wrongful death statute.
Furthermore, while a woman's right to privacy is the policy
involved in the abortion decision, the policy that a tortfeasor should
not escape liability is involved in the wrongful death decision. One
decision does not solve the controversy of the other.--
A more recent case that exemplified the child metaphor of the fetus
was the 1997 case Whither v. State of South Carolina 69 In this case,
Cornelia Whitner pled guilty to criminal child neglect for causing her
baby to be born with cocaine in its system."' 0 During her third trimester
of pregnancy, Whitner consumed crack and was sentenced to eight years
in prison.371 In Whitner's petition for post conviction relief, she claimed
ineffective assistance of counsel because her lawyer failed to advise her
the statute she was prosecuted under may not apply to prenatal drug use.37
Her petition was granted but the state appealed?' The statute in question
read as follows:
Any person having the legal custody of any child or helpless
person, who shall, without lawful excuse, refuse or neglect to
3651rd.35Id.
"
57Farley, 195 WV.Va. at 534.
6'SId. at 534-35.
.. Vitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
3701d. at 780.
3711d.
372Id. at 782.
373d.
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provide... the proper care and attention for such child or helpless
person, so that the life, health or comfort of such child or helpless
person is endangered or is likely to be endangered, shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and shall be punished within the discretion of the
circuit court.374
The court noted that "child" under the state's Children's Code means any
person under the age of eighteen.375 Thus, the court focused on whether
a fetus is a person.376 The court observed that "South Carolina law has
long recognized that viable fetuses are persons holding certain legal rights
and privileges." 377 The court specifically cited a 1960 case, Hall v.
Murphy,378 where a newborn died four hours after birth due to prenatal but
post-viable injuries. 3 The court in Hall found that the appellants' claim
that the fetus was merely an appendage to the mother to be "unsound,
illogical and unjust" and found no medical basis for the assumed identity
of mother and child.380 The court concluded that a viable fetus is not a
mere appendage but is indeed a child.381' The Whitner court looked to
other cases that asserted the same person metaphor: that a viable fetus is
a person.382 Throughout the opinion, Justice Toal referred to the unborn
viable child.383 He surveyed a number of cases from other states, noting
that not all states construe a fetus as a child, whether or not it is viable.384
In Massachusetts, for example, the Superior Court found two cases
(Commonwealth v. Cass85 and Commonwealth v. Lawrence386) to "accord
legal rights to the unborn only where the mother's or parents' interest in
the potentiality of life, not the state's interest, are sought to be
vindicated. '38 7 The Whitner court was not persuaded by this line of
374Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 782.
37SId"
376Id
377Id. at 785.
37s 13 S.E.2d 790 (S.C. 1960).
3791d.
3811d.
312Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 785.
3831d.
3 841d
"
38467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984).
386536 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1989).
3
"jWhitner, 492 S.E.2d at 783 (citing Commonwealth v. Pelligrini, No. 87970, slip op.
(Mass. Super Ct. 1990)).
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argument.388 The court found no ambiguity in the statute and no
ambiguity with the word "person." 369  Justice Finney reflected his
incredulity in his dissenting opinion.39' Finney claimed that the word
"child" in the statute means a child in being and not a fetus. 391 He
outlined two important points: the child abuse statute imposes criminal
liability upon a person who has legal custody of a child (a concept
inapplicable to a fetus) and statutory harms that are criminalized can only
be directed toward a child and not a fetus.
392
Finally, it is worth noting one more case that addressed the "person"
status of a fetus. In Douglas v. Town ofHartford,393 Rosalee Douglas was
nearly six months pregnant.394 She was hit so hard by a police officer that
the blows caused serious physical injuries to her baby, Paul Douglas. 395
The plaintiff argued that her fetus was a person within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and was due damages under the statute.3 6 The court noted
that although several federal courts had ruled that a fetus is not entitled to
civil rights and constitutional protections under Sec. 1983, the trend in the
state courts was to expand the rights of the fetus in a wide variety of
contexts.
397
LEGAL STATUS OF EMBRYONIC LIFE
Each of the previous cases addressed the status of fetal life. The legal
status of early embryonic life suddenly became an issue in the 1970s and
1980s. An early case was Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital.3 3 In this
case, the Del Zios underwent IVF treatment. 399 Dr. William Sweeney of
New York Hospital performed the procedure. Q0 One day after the
fertilized ova was placed in the incubator, Dr. Vande Wiele, Chairman of
"sId. at 785.
'891d.
.
353Id.
39Id
32Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 787.
'
93Douglas v. Town of Hartford, 542 F. Supp. 1267, 1269 (D.C. Conn. 1982).
39Id.
39s1d.3961d.
3971d.
3
"Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hosp., 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14450, at *1 (1978).39Id.
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Obstetrics/Gynecology of Columbia ordered the contents of the test tube
to be destroyed.40 ' Dr. Wiele was concerned about the safety of the
procedure, as well as the competence of Dr. Sweeney. 402 The plaintiffs
sued both for intentional infliction of emotional distress as well as
conversion ofproperty.4 3 Although the court did not squarely address the
status of the embryo in this case, the plaintiffs conversion theory strongly
suggests that they treated the embryo as their property, rather than as a
person.4 4
Some philosophers, notably Engelhardt, have defended the notion of
viewing embryonic material as property.405 For instance, he states that we
could imagine ourselves buying and selling zygotes as if they were
products.40 6 He regards the fetus "as a special form of very dear property
... [and that] privately produced embryos and fetuses are private
property."407 The metaphor of the embryo as private property frames the
issue of fetal life very differently than if we think of the fetus as a
potential murder victim or a potential plaintiff. Although Del Zio reflects
this view, other cases depart from viewing embryos strictly as property.
Davis v. Davis is perhaps the most famous case that attempted to assess
the status offrozenpre-embryos.0 8 The Supreme Court of Tennessee held
that the fate of a couple's fertilized ova, which the court called "pre-
embryos," should ordinarily be decided by "the party wishing to avoid
procreation" if the other party has the reasonable possibility of achieving
parenthood by other means and the parties have not made an agreement
regarding their disposition.40 9 Being a case of first impression, there was
little legislative guidance available.410
In this case, Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis were in the throes of
a divorce. 41 ' The only area of contention between the Davises was the
disposition of seven frozen embryos as part of the dissolution of their
401ld.
4 2Id.
4
°
3DelZio, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14450, at *I.
4041d.
4051td.
4 6ENGELHARDT, supra note 55, at 156.407Id. at 255.4
°Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).409id.
4101d. at 589.4111d.
[Vol. 2:703
METAPHORICAL IMAGINATION: FETUSES & EMBRYOS
marriage.412 Mary Sue Davis wanted control of the embryos to implant
them later; Junior Davis opposed this plan, arguing that he wanted to keep
the embryos frozen until he decided whether he wanted to later become a
father outside of marriage.413 The trial court ruled in favor of Mary Sue
Davis, stating that the embryos were human beings from conception. 41 4
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the lower court's ruling, stating
that it violated Junior Davis's constitutional rights not to procreate where
no pregnancy took place.4 1 ' The Court of Appeals eventually awarded the
parties xvith joint control of the embryos.416
By the time the Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case, the
two parties again changed their views about the fate of the embryos
1 7
Mary Sue (who was now remarried) wished to donate them; Junior wanted
to discard them. 8 In the absence of any cryopreservation disposition
agreement between the parties, as well as a complete lack of any case law
to guide the court, this was a case of first impression. 9
In reviewing the trial court's opinions, the court acknowledged the
differences in status that are suggested by using different labels in trying
to describe prenatal life, such as pre-embryo, embryo, fetus and so forth. z'
The court also cited the testimony of Dr. Jerome Lejeune, a French
geneticist. Dr. Lejeune frequently referred to the four-cell pre-embryos as
"early human beings," "tiny persons," and "kin."42' Dr. Irving King, the
fertility specialist who treated Mary Sue, countered Dr. Lejeune's
contention, calling the entity up to fourteen days a pre-embryo.!'t
The trial court was persuaded by Dr. Lejeune's testimony, agreeing
with his assertion that the distinction between pre-embryos and embryos
was an artificial one and that the eight-cell entities in question were indeed
"children in vitro."4 3 The trial court awarded custody of the pre-embryos
4121d.413Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589.
4141d.4151d.
4161d.
417 1d. at 590.
418Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.4191d.
4101d. at 592-93.
4211d. at 593.42Id.
423Davis, 842 SAV.2d at 594.
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to Mary Sue, arguing that in their "best interests" they should be allowed
to be born. 2
4
Although Mary Sue abandoned her argument regarding the pre-
embryos' right to be born, the American Fertility Society, among other
organizations, persuaded the Tennessee Supreme Court to consider this
issue of the pre-embryos' status.42 5 The court embraced the lower court's
ruling in this matter.4 26 For instance, the Court of Appeals reasoned that
a Tennessee wrongful death statute required live birth before a wrongful
death action could take place.427 Being a viable fetus without live birth is
simply not enough, in this court's eyes,428 Moreover, the court had held
in a number of cases that live birth must occur in order for a fetus to
become a person.429
The court also looked to Tennessee statutes, which reflected the
trimester approach of Roe v. Wade.430 The court noted that this approach
gave embryos a greater status as they developed, but that even after
viability, fetuses did not merit the same respect as live infants.43' The
court also noted that Tennessee's murder and assault statutes criminalized
an attack or homicide of a viable fetus.4 2
The court then cited both Roe v. Wade and Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services.43 The court held that the unborn have never been
regarded as "persons in the whole sense. ' 434 Although the court agreed
with this view, the court was troubled by the intermediate court's
awarding ofjoint custody of the pre-embryos to both parties. 435 The court
found fault with the intermediate court's reliance on the Tennessee
statutes modeled after the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.436 The court
4241d.424I "
4261d.4271d. at 594-95.
42 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595.429Id. at 594-95 ( citing Hamby v. McDaniel, 559 S.W.2d 774, 777 (Tenn. 1977); Durrett
v. Owens, 371 S.W.2d 433,434 (Tenn. 1963); Shousha v. Matthews DrivurselfServ., 358 S.W.2d
471,476 (Tenn. 1962); Hogan v. McDaniel, 319 S.W.2d 221,244 (Tenn. 1958)).
4301d. at 595.
431Id.
432zn. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107, 214 (1998).
433Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989)).4341d. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)).43SId. at 595.
436Id. at 596 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-30-101 to 68-30-111 (1998)).
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made the distinction between the status of tissue (which the statutes cover)
and the status of the embryo.4 37 The court argued that the statutes did not
cover the pre-embryos because of their potential for life.433
The court was also troubled by the lower court's reliance on York v.
Jones.439 In this case, a couple sued the Jones Institute for Reproductive
Medicine in Virginia because the Institute refused to transfer their "frozen
embryo" to a California fertility clinic' °  Because there was a
cryopreservation agreement between the parties, the court argued that this
created a bailment relationship. 41 In relying on this case, however, the
intermediate court failed to define the interest Mary Sue and Junior Davis
had in their pre-embryos. 442 It did imply, however, that the Davises had
a property interest in their pre-embryos. 43
The status of frozen embryos emerged again in the 1997 case Kass
v. Kass.4" The Kasses underwent IVF treatment at a Long Island IVF
facility and executed a cryopreservation disposition agreement." In the
agreement, they stated that in the event of a divorce legal ownership of the
zygotes would be determined in a property settlement." 6 The Kasses
eventually filed for divorce.447 Maureen Kass wanted sole custody of the
pre-embryos.448 Steve Kass wanted the IVF program to retain the pre-
embryos for study and research.449 The trial court awarded Mrs. Kass
custody of the pre-embryos.450 The court reasoned that the pre-embryos
were not mere property but still did not have the status of persons.45'
Moreover, the court determined that the father's procreative rights in this
situation were no greater than in a conventional in vivo fertilization, and
therefore the woman had sole discretion to their disposition.4 2 The court
4 37 d.
438Davis, 842 SAV.2d at 596.
4391d. (citing York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989)).
"'York, 717 F. Supp. at 424.
"Id. at 425.
4 21d.
'3Davis v. Davis, 842 SAV.2d 58S, 596 (Tenn. 1992).
'
4 Kassv. Kass, 235 A.D.2d 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), qf'd, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1993).
44 1d. at 151.
"
6Id. at 152.
447 d. at 153.
441d.
449Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 153.4
"OId. at 154.
4SId.
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also determined that the agreement the Kasses executed was not
dispositive; it ultimately gave Mrs. Kass the exclusive control of the pre-
embryos. 453 The appellate court disagreed and found that the Kasses'
informed consent document reflected the couples' mutual intent. 5 4 The
Court of Appeals of New York, reviewed the case and rendered a decision
in May of 1998 .4" This court affirmed the appellate court's decision that
the Kasses' cryopreservation agreement controlled the fate of the frozen
embryos. 4 6 This view seems to be in accord with the view proposed by
John Robertson that progenitors hold a "bundle of rights" with regard to
the pre-embryos. 45' This bundle can be exercised through the use of
disposition agreements, as in this case.458 The court quickly dismissed the
person metaphor, stating that pre-zygotes are not persons for constitutional
purposes: "The relevant inquiry thus becomes who has dispositional
authority over them. Because that question is answered in this case by the
parties' agreement, for purposes of resolving the present appeal we have
.no cause to decide whether the pre-zygotes are entitled to 'special
respect.'2 4
59
Once again, this case exemplified the property metaphor of the
embryo. In response to the opinion, John Kerry, executive director of the
New York State Catholic Conference stated: "I think the fundamental
problem here is that the unborn children are being treated as if they were
products, not human beings with all the attendant sanctity and dignity
attributable to human life.4 61 On the other hand, Janet Benshoof,
president of the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy argued: "The
court is honoring the contract and not treating frozen embryos as though
they are a special class of property that fall outside of contract law. It's
a very good opinion. It's straightforward. It uses contract law and gives
guidance to everyone in the field.' 61
453Id
"
4S4Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 154.4SSKass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
4561d. at 175.4 71d. at 179.4581d.
4591d.
46 0Raymond Hemandez, Court Blocks Use of Embryos Without Ex-Husband's Consent,
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1988, at B2.4611d.
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Moral Status of Embryonic Life
In addressing the status of the embryo, one must be careful about a few
things. First, one should understand the scientific facts. Can biological
distinctions be drawn between the pre-embryo, the embryo and the fetus?
Do these differences matter morally or legally or both? Second, one
should ask whether these entities have a different status ex utero. Roe v.
Wade only considered the status of the fetus in utero, whereby a woman's
privacy interests had to be addressed.462 But is there a difference between
a pre-embryo in utero and a frozen pre-embryo stored ex vivo in a
fertilization clinic?
The pre-embryo develops during the first two weeks after
fertilization.463 After fertilization, which occurs in the ampulla of the
oviduct, the first cleavage divisions occur (consisting of 2 to 16 cells) 4
The zygote is then termed a blastocyst.6 5 By the fourth day of
development, the blastocyst is free in the uterus.46' By the fifth to sixth
day, the blastocyst hatches and begins implanting.4 67 During the next few
days, the blastocyst is fully implanted.46s And by the thirteenth or
fourteenth day, the primary stem villi as well as the primitive streak
appears.469 According to Larsen:
The appearance of the primitive streak established the longitudinal
axis and thus the bilateral symmetry of the future adult: the tissues
to the right of this structure give rise to the right side of the body,
and the tissues to the left of it give rise, in general, to the left side
of the body.70
In Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court made a distinction between
the pre-embryo and embryo based on the point of pluripotency.471 Only
45According to John Robertson, Roe v. Made has no impact on the legal status of the
embryo ex utero. Abortion law never applied to the destruction of embryos before pregnaney
occurs, therefore Roe need not be reversed for states to protect extracorporeal embryos. JOte.
ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE 104 (1994).4
sId.
44Id.
4651d.
4"Id.
467ROBERTSON, supra note 462.
469Id.
470%W1ILLA MJ. LARSEN, EssENTILS OF HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 49 (1998).
47'Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596 (Tenn. 1992).
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when the cells of the pre-embryo lose their ability to form any type of cell
(pluripotency) and start to form the different structures of the embryo,
does the pre-embryo become an embryo.472 Davis held that the entity that
exists before the development of embryonic structures, the pre-embryo,
should have a different legal status from that of the embryo.4 73 The court
rejected the argument that the embryo and pre-embryo should have the
same legal status because both have identical genetic structures. 474 The
court understood that "certain features of the pre-embryo - its lack of a
nervous system, its ability to turn into more than one individual, and its
inability to develop without further intervention (transfer to a uterus) -
justify ascribing to the pre-embryo a different moral status from that of the
implanted embryo." 475 One legal commentator points out, however, that
a pre-embryo's genetic information is determined at conception,
regardless of whether that pre-embryo splits into twins. 476 This view is
echoed by Clifford Grobstein, a retired embryologist, who argues that "the
pre-embryo is unquestionably human in biological terms. '477 He contends
that the scientific definition ofahuman requires a certain number, size and
shape of chromosomes, a certain sequence ofnucleotides in its DNA, and
a certain sequence of amino acids in its proteins.478 He thinks that the pre-
embryo meets all of these requirements, and therefore, is biologically
human.479 Unfortunately, Grobstein seems a bit confused when he asserts
that being a human is at least a minimal requirement for personhood. As
many philosophers have argued, to be a person does not require
membership in the species Homo Sapiens. Personhood has a variety of
psychological requirements that could be met with an entity with a
different biological structure (such as E.T.) or no biological structure
(such as HAL from 2001: A Space Odyssey).
In addition to having a unique genetic structure, Grobstein argues that
pre-embryos are undoubtedly alive.480 They exchange respiratory gases,
4 Vicki G. Norton, UnnaturalSelection: NontherapeuticReimplantation Genetic Scrccning
and Proposed Regulation, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1581, 1634 (1994).47 1d. (citing Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596-97).
4741d. (citing Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 593).
475STEIBOCIK, supra note 6 at 215.476Norton, supra note 472 at 1635.
41CLIFFORD GROBSTEIN, SCIENCE ANI THE UNBORN 65 (1988).4781d.
4791d.4S0Id. at 66.
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metabolize chemicals and will continue to divide.4 1 Even at this low-
level of organization, Grobstein argues that these cells are unique because
of their capability to divide many times and to specialize into more
complex cell structures.4  Moreover, he states that this ability of the pre-
embryo to grow points to a "profound potential" of the pre-embryo to
become an "undeniable person."4 3 This language goes beyond the
language of the American Fertility Society (AFS).4  The AFS's policy
statement concerning the status of the pre-embryo suggests that it is not
even human life.43 5 But Grobstein contends that the pre-embryo is
undeniably human in its genetic structure and alive.426
Perhaps the strongest criticism against the use ofthe term pre-embryo
has come from John Marshall, a clinical neurology professor and a
member of the Warnock Committee:
The term "pre-embryo" was not heard of prior to all of this debate
[on embryo experimentation]. From the time of fertilization up to
about the eighth week the entity was called "embryo." Suddenly
this term "pre-embryo" is now in every paper and every
symposium. Some scientists are saying that theyhadbeen thinking
along these lines already in 1975. It is surprising that if they had
been thinking about it as farback as 1975, they never actually used
the term until now. It seems like a public relations manoevre to
make people think that the experts are against embryo
experimentation, but that it is alright to experiment on the "pre-
embryo" as if the latter was somehow different.4S7
This discussion reveals that there is not only confusion as to pre-embryos'
moral and legal status, but that there is also some debate over their
biological status. Grobstein argues that pre-embryos are, in fact, alive and
genetically human.48' But so what? As George Annas has stated, if a fire
broke out in a laboratory where pre-embryos were stored and where a two-
month old baby was trapped, and there was only enough time to save the
4811d
"4 2GRoBSTEIN, supra note 477, at 66.
413id. at 67.4S14d. at 94-95.
4S5id.
4
s51d. at 66-67.
4SSTEINBOCK, supra note 6, at 214.411GROBSTEIN, supra note 477, at 66-67.
1999]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW[
baby or the pre-embryos, but not both, who would forsake the baby to
save the pre-embryos? 489 As Steinbock notes, these kinds of sentiments
strongly suggest that no one equates pre-embryos with children, or even
pets.490
Even if Grobstein is correct that a human life exists within the pre-
embryo, when does this human life begin? At fertilization? Robert
Edwards, the embryologist who collaborated with Patrick Steptoe on the
first "test tube" baby, questions the assumption that fertilization confers
human status.491 Does this matter in the discussion as to whether pre-
embryos are persons or property? The answer depends upon what set of
criteria is used for such concepts as personhood and property. The
metaphors we use strongly shape our moral sentiments toward certain
creatures, whether person or property.
The concepts ofpersonhood and property are idealized and abstract.
We tend to associate personhood with biological humans, and similarly,
we tend to associate property with non-human entities (whether alive or
inanimate). These assumptions, however, are faulty and inadequate in
assessing the moral worth of certain entities. Ronald Dworkin, for
instance, does not think the issue of personhood is that crucial.492 He
develops two interests, derivative and detached, to protect human life.493
A derivative interest would claim that a fetus is a person from the moment
of conception and that it should be protected from that moment onward.494
A detached interest protects the intrinsic value of human life, but not any
particular human life.495 Dworkin subscribes to the second interest.496
Dworkin believes that the derivative-interest folks are engaging in a
contradiction when they argue that fetuses are persons, yet permit
abortions in the cases of rape or incest.497 This is because it is never
morally permissible to take the life of a person (except in self-defense).498
Therefore, derivative interest folks do not really believe the fetus is an
48gSTEINBOCK, supra note 6, at 215.490Id
491ROBERT EDWARDS, LIFE BEFORE BiRTH: REFLECTIONS ON THE EMBRYO DEBATE 49-54
(1989).
492RONALD DwORKiN, LIFE's DoMINION 13 (1994).493id.414Id.
4951d.
4961d. at 12-24.497DWORKIN, supra note 492, at 32.49sd"
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actual person.499 Rather, Dworkin argues that everyone condemns
abortion (even pro-choice folks) because of the detached interest view.""
We all (or almost all) treat human life as sacred, and think "it is
intrinsically a bad thing, a kind of cosmic shame, when human life at any
stage is deliberately extinguished." '' Dworkin expands his theorybeyond
just human life to encompass endangered species of animals.'0 He states
again that "[w]e consider it a kind of cosmic shame when a species that
nature has developed ceases, through human actions, to exist."' 3
Although this article also reaches Dworkin's ultimate conclusion, it
diverges from his in that it holds that a fetus primarily derives its moral
status from persons in a strict sense because it is some form of human life.
In a derivative framework, pet animals have moral statuses similar to
human fetuses, not because of biologies, but because animal pets are
persons in a weak social sense (as construed by persons in a strict sense).
Moreover, this view avoids certain metaphysical overtones entailed by the
use of "sacred" which has strong religious roots. It is a secular argument
that attempts to bridgeparochial differences over the status of the embryo.
It is unnecessary for a person to be biologically human. If we are
going to abide by the criteria set forth by philosophers such as Tooley,
Warren and Engelhardt, then personhood does not entail biological
humanhood.504 Thus, a creature with a very different genetic structure can
be classified as a person. Conversely, property need not exclude
something that is biologically human.
Although laypersons often refer to property as "things," legally,
property has a more refined meaning. As one commentator has noted,
"property-as-thing" confuses for tvo reasons: "property-as-thing" is not
the same as subjects of property, and "property-as-thing" neglects to
encompass intangible subjects ofproperty.5 s It is a "dynamic" rather than
a static set ofrights. Property, then, is "dominion or indefinite right of use
or disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or
4
_Id. at 19-20.50 Id. at 19.
5 1d. at 13.
5 2DwORKIN, supra note 492, at 75.
SG3Id.
SSARTUR .P BAUER, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF FETAL TISSUE TRAr.SFORTAT ON.
60-61 (1994).
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subjects. 5 °6 Because it is a very flexible concept, it provides courts with
some amount of discretion in analyzing cases concerning reproductive
technologies. The appendage and person metaphors so often used in
describing fetal life are inadequate to fully capture the moral status of
early embryonic life. They are persons in a very weak social sense,
somewhat akin to animal pets, and thus the objects of our moral regard.
They also have certain property characteristics, but they are not mere
things. As George Annas has argued:
[E]mbryos could just as easily be considered neither products nor
people, but in some other category altogether. There are many
things, such as dogs, dolphins, and redwoods that are neither
products nor people. We nonetheless legally protect these entities
by limiting what their owners or custodians can do with them.
Every national commission worldwide that has examined the status
of the human embryo to date has placed it in this third category;
neither people nor products, but nonetheless entities of unique
symbolic value that deserve society's respect and protection.50 7
Similar to sentient animals, embryos and early fetuses occupy a special
place in our web of duties and rights.
There exists almost virtual consensus that embryos and fetuses lack
the criteria that would place them within the category of'persons in a strict
sense.08  Persons in a strict sense possess criteria such as self-
consciousness, rationality, a minimal moral sense and freedom.50 9
Engelhardt's two-tiered definition of persons-persons in the strict sense
and persons in the social sense-would leave no room for embryos and
early fetuses.10 Warren's set of criteria for personhood (consciousness,
self-consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity and language)
would not encompass early fetal life either.5"' Some kind of interest
principle, argued by philosophers such as Tooley and Steinbock, would
also find the embryo and early fetus to be lacking as well.' 12 So what kind
"°BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1216 (6th ed. 1990).
S"STwBOCK, supra note 6, at 216.
50SENGELHARDT, supra note 55, at 119-20.
s09Id. at 115-20.
5101d.
5111d.
512See generally STEINBOCK, supra note 6, at 216.
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of argument could one offer to protect the embryo and early fetus? One
of the more popular arguments is the potentiality argument.513 This
argument states that because embryos and early fetuses have such a strong
potential to become persons, they should then be treated as if they were
persons.514 This view has been criticized by a number of people."'
Engelhardt simply states that only actual persons have actual rights;
potential persons only have potential rights.516 The common example
given is that of the president; an actual president has actual rights and
duties, a potential president only has potential rights and duties." 7
Instead of using potential, however, let us use the words possible and
probable. For instance, when Bill Clinton ran for president in 1992, he
was an actual presidential candidate, but only a possible president. When
he became elected, he became an actual president-elect but still a probable
president. A week before his inauguration in January of 1993, he was still
an actual president-elect, but became a highly probable president. Only
after he was inaugurated by Chief Justice Rehnquist did Clinton become
an actual president, with all the rights and duties that office possesses.
JohnNoonan uses a similar argument whereby he argues that spermatozoa
can become possible persons, although the chances are quite small (one
in hundreds of million).518 Assume a spermatozoa is a minutely possible
person. Once the sperm reaches the egg and produces a zygote, that
zygote then has a good probability of becoming a person (about one out
of two).519 Do possibilities and probabilities change our views toward
certain things? Indeed they do. We tend to take more seriously
probabilities as opposed to mere possibilities. That is the reasonjurors in
a criminal trial have to believe beyond a reasonable doubt (about a 95
percent probability) that the defendant committed the crime. Even in a
civil trial setting, a mere possibility is not sufficient enough to hold
someone accountable for a tort. A more-likely-than-not standard is
usually the minimal standard, whereas the clear and convincing standard
is the more stringent standard. So how does a fiftypercent probability that
a zygote will develop into a person influence our thinking? Well, of
13ENGELHARDT, supra note 56, at 110-13.514Id
"
515Id.5161d.
5171d.
518STEINBOCK, supra note 6, at 63.
S19id.
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course, a probable person still does not have the same rights and duties
that an actual person does. Yet a fifty percent probability seems to
indicate that the zygote merits some level of rights (but not full rights).
Moreover, a probable person can hardly be the bearer of duties,
considering that even persons in the social sense cannot bear duties (but
can possess rights).
Although only persons in the strict sense can bear both duties and
rights, we can only assign rights to persons in the social sense. For
instance, Engelhardt distinguishes between a variety of persons: persons
in a strict sense he calls persons(I).520 He labels children who have nearly
all the rights of strict persons as persons(2).521 He labels people with
severe dementia who were once strict persons but are no longer as
persons(3).522 He labels severely retarded people who have never been
persons in a strict sense nor never will be as persons(4).5 23 And he labels
permanently unconscious people who will never become persons in a
strict sense as persons(5).524 Although Engelhardt offers a nuanced
description of persons in the social sense, for some reason he denies this
status to certain higher animals.5 25 His very own view argues against a
speciesism whereby only human beings have moral status.126 If being
biologically human is not a necessary condition to be a person in the strict
sense, then it certainly is unnecessary to be a person in the social sense.5 27
The metaphors we frequently use in describing animal pets (as "children"
for instance) suggest that they are persons in a weak social sense.528
Engelhardt places creatures such as infants, the severely retarded and the
severely demented into the category of persons in a social sense.129 But
he regards animals, who are sentient and have the ability to suffer, as non-
persons.530 One may argue that animal pets have a strong derivative status
because of our relationship with them. Pet owners commonly refer to
their pet animals as companions or members of the family. Dog owners
520ENGELHARDT, supra note 55, at 119.521id.
22Id.
52'1d.
524 1d.
52'ENGELHARDT, supra note 55, at 113-15.526
rd.
5271d. at 116-17.
'
2
'Id. at 129.
'291d. at 115-17.
"
0 ENGELHARDT, supra note 55, at 113-15.
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especially have very close relationships with their dogs. Prohibitions
against torturing animals suggest that animals have more value than mere
nonpersons. Yet we commonly euthanize animals by the millions. How
do we reconcile this seeming contradiction? Pet animals have a special
status in our moral community, so special that animal pets may be
considered persons in a weak social sense. Creatures who are persons in
a weak social sense should be contrasted with creatures such as infants,
the severely retarded and the severely demented. They are persons in a
strong social sense. We are prohibited from torturing persons in the weak
social sense as well as persons in a strong social sense. Yetwe commonly
euthanize persons in a weak social sense whenever we take sick or lost
dogs to the ASPCA. Similarly, embryos and fetuses are commonly
aborted, although we are morally prohibited from torturing a sentient fetus
or injuring a fetus that will become a harmed person. Like our pet
animals, embryos and fetuses (who are probable persons) are persons in
a weak social sense. To be more precise, fetuses are persons in a weak
social sense, embryos are persons in a weaker social sense, and pre-
embryos are persons in a weakest social sense. Similarly, pet animals are
persons in a weak social sense, whereas animals used for research
purposes and animals bred for consumption are persons in a weaker social
sense. The distinction between pet animals and animals bred for food and
research has to do with their relational status to other persons. Placing
early embryos on a level lower than animals bred for consumption, is
because early embryos lack sentience or the ability to feel pain.
Therefore, they should not have greater rights than creatures that do have
these characteristics. However, this does not completely denigrate the
status of the early embryo. Because of its probable personhood, the early
embryo should be treated with some modicum of respect. These
gradations suggest that these entities possess a modest level of rights, but
do not possess an absolute right to life. Moreover, this metaphor of a
person in aweak social sense seems to conform with our moral intuitions.
We want to protect both animals (because of their ability to suffer) and
fetuses (because of their probable personhood), yet we recognize they do
not possess an absolute right to life. In fact, even persons in a strict sense
lack absolute rights.
1999]
DEPAuL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW[
Persons' relationships to animals has received greater attention over
the last two decades.531 Animals were not completely ignored in earlier
times, but their moral status was not controversial. Aristotle conceded
that animals had certain faculties, such as nutrition, locomotion and
sensation, but lacked thought.5 32 The Stoics believed that animals existed
solely to serve man's interests. 33 Christian thinking towards animals was
even less charitable.534 Because of scriptural pronouncements, animals
possessed merely instrumental value.535 Descartes viewed animals as
mere automata. 36 Hobbes believed that one had no obligations to animals
because of the impossibility to convenant with them. 37 Human
superiority was reflected through man's use of speech, reason and
religion.538 Cartesianism rationalized cruel treatment toward animals by
depriving them of an immortal soul (for how could a compassionate God
permit creatures with immortal souls to live so miserably?).539 Only
during the modem period did Western views of animals start to change.
Dogs and cats became quite common in early modem English
households.5 40 For Bentham, a creature's moral status was not due to its
ability to think or reason but rather its ability to suffer and feel pleasure. 54 t
And for contemporary ethicists, such as Erich Loewy, it is this ability to
suffer that is the sine qua non of moral status.542 Keith Thomas argues
that the modem sensibility toward animals has been quite ambiguous. 43
Although official pronouncements tended to condemn animals to a lowly
status, the behavior of people towards animals suggests otherwise.
Similarly, our moral sensibilities toward the status of the fetus has been
one of ambiguity, and not, as John Noonan argues, "an almost absolute
value in history."544
131See KEITH THOMAS, MAN AND THE NATURAL WVORLD: A HISTORY OF THE MODERN
SENSmIIuTY (1983). The following discussion is borrowed from Thomas's book.5321d.
5331d.
5341d.
53Sd.
s36See THOMAS, supra note 53 1.
S3 Id.
53SId.5391d.
5401d.54
'See THOMAS, supra note 53 1.
S42ERICH LOEWVY, FREEDOM AND COMMuNIYy: THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF ETHcs (1993).543Id.
544Id.
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This ambiguity has been reflected in the few American cases
concerning early embryos that have made it to court. For instance, in the
aforementioned case York v. Jones,-54 the federal court that heard the case
applied property law principles to the case, and did not consider the early
embryos to be persons.546 Conversely, the jury in Del Zio rejected the
theory that the early embryo in question was property.' In trying to
define the status of the pre-embryo, the Davis court relied entirely on the
amicus brief offered by the American Fertility Society. 43 The AFS
offered the conventional analysis that the embryo may occupy one of any
categories or statuses: person, property or an intermediate position.: 9
Although some deference was given to the scientific testimony of Dr.
Lejuene, the court relied much more heavily on the pronouncements of a
professional body, in this case the AFS.550 John Robertson, who sat on the
Ethics Committee of the AFS, provided the testimony for the
organization. 51
Davis v. Davis offered a new way of thinking about early embryos.
Not just appendages of the mother, but not exactly persons (or even
distinct entities such as late-term fetuses), the pre-embryo was classified
as"unique."'552 This view echoes the earlier view of Richard Wasserstrom,
who argued "that the fetus is in a distinctive, relatively unique moral
category, in which its status is close to but not identical with that of a
typical adult."5 53 Yet the Davis court's description of the pre-embryo as
being unique is not nearly as conservative as Wasserstrom's, which places
the status of the fetus on much higher ground."
LEGISLATION
Beside case law, state legislatures have promulgated rules regarding
certain procedures involving embryonic/fetal life."' A few states, for
"
5York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421,427 (E.D. Va. 1989).
4Id
547Id.
SDavis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596-97 (Tenn. 1992).
50Id. at 597.
SOId. at 594.
5511d.
S 2Id.
5
'3Richard Wasserstrom, The Status of the Fetus, HAsTUwGS CI"L MAG., (1975).
5uId.
555For a good review of current legislation, see Christine L. Feile, Human Embryo
Experimentation: Regulation and Relative Rights, 66 FODHA. L. REv. 2435 (1993).
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instance, ban the frozen embryo process completely. They are
Minnesota,556 Michigan5 7 and Illinois." 8 Similarly, there is little
legislative guidance with egg donation. Only four states (Oklahoma,- 9
Texas,56 ° Florida56' and Virginia 62) have laws on egg donation. The laws
in these states treat egg donation like sperm donation, transferring all
parental rights to the recipient. Regarding the embryo, the only state that
explicitly defines the embryo is Louisiana. 63 Louisiana law defines the
human embryo as "an in vitro fertilized human ovum... composed of one
or more living human cells and human genetic material so unified and
organized that it will develop in utero into an unborn child."5" The in
vitro fertilized ovum is a "juridical person" that has the capacity to sue and
be sued and is not considered property.565 If the ovum fails to develop
over a thirty six-hour period, then it is considered non-viable and is not
considered a juridical person. 66 Moreover, the Louisiana law prohibits
any commercial use of the embryo and also prohibits creating embryos
strictly for research purposes.5 67
Louisiana's statutes seem to reflect Canadian rather than American
values. A 1996 bill in the Canadian Parliament (Bill C-47), in fact, sought
to prohibit any commercial use of the embryo, as well as prohibit creation
of research embryos. Louisiana's stance on fetal life is one of the most
conservative in the United States. This state wants to protect prenatal life
to the greatest extent possible, as allowed under the Constitution. 68 On
the other hand, a number of other states provide for only certain kinds of
protection for the embryo or fetus, compatible withRoe and its progeny.5
69
.
56See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (Vest 1998).
SS7 ee MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2685 (West 1998).
5"See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/6 (7) (West 1999).
s"'See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 554 (West 1999).560See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.102 (West 1999).
"1'See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212 (1) (1) (Vest 1998).
562See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289.1 (Michie 1998).
56'See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (West 1999).
'64See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121-133 (West 1991).16'See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 124 (west 1998).
'6See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 129 (West 1998).
567See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122 (West 1998).
56'June Coleman, Playing God orPlayingScientist: A ConstitutionalAnalysisofStateLaws
Banning Embryological Procedures, 27 PAC. L.J. 1331 (19_.).
56"For instance, in Arizona, experimentation on live or dead fetuses/embryos produced from
induced abortions is strictly prohibited, except for diagnostic purposes. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §
36-2302. In Arkansas, the state regulates the disposal of dead fetuses, which are defined as human
conception products that die before expulsion from their mothers. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-
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With regard to research on dead embryos and fetuses, the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research recommended that dead fetuses be treated in the
same manner as other human cadavers, pointing out that "moral concern
should extend to all who share human genetic heritage, and that the fetus,
regardless of life prospects, should be treated respectfully and vith
dignity."'57 On the federal level, the Human Embryo Research Panel
described the preimplantation embryo as a "developing form of human
life" that "does not have the same moral status as infants and children"
because of the "absence of developmental individuation... the lack of
even the possibility of sentience" and the "very high rate of natural
801 (1995). Moreover, non-therapeutic research on live fetuses is prohibited; research on dead
embryos or fetuses is permitted only with the permission of the mother. See AM STAT. Arn. §
20-17-802 (1995). No commercial exchange with fetuses or embryos is permitted either. See
ARx STAT. ANN. § 20-17-802(c) (1995). In California, non-therapeutic r".earch on live embryos
or fetuses is prohibited; such research is permissible with dead fetal remains. See CAL [HEALTH
& SAETY CODE § 123440 (1996). Florida has a statute that requires a person who induces the
termination of a viable fetus to use the same kind of professional skill as would be needed to
preserve the life of a viable fetus intended to be born. See FLA. STAT. § 390.001 (1996).
Moreover, non-therapeutic research on a live fetus is prohibited. See FLA. STAT. § 390.001 (6)
(1996). Indianaprohibits non-pathological experiments on fetuses. Sc ItD.DCODEAtN. § 16-34-
2-6 (1997). Kentucky prohibits the commercial exchange of viable aborted children for
experimentation. See Ky. REV. STAT. § 436.026. Maine prohibits the use ofconception products
in research. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, 1593 (1992). Massachusetts prohibits non-
therapeutic experimentation on live fetuses. See MASS. AN. LAWS ch. 112, 12J (1991).
Michigan limits non-therapeutic research to certain cases (when the reearch does not substantially
jeopardize the health or life of the embryo or if the embryo is not the product of a planned
abortion). See MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. 333.2685 (1992). Minnesota permits rezearch on
embryos only when it is harmless to the conceptus. See MmN,. STAT. ANN. 145A22 (1939).
Missouri and Montana prohibit non-therapeutic research on live fetuses. See MO. REV. STAT. §
188.037 (1996). Montana also criminalizes the intentional killing of a prematurely born fetus.
See MoNT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-108 (1997). Nebraska prohibits the commercial sale of live
fetuses for research purposes as well as non-therapeutic research on the fetus. See NEB. RE%.
STAT. § 28-342 (1996). New Hampshire prohibits the transfer ofa pre-embryo to a uterine cavity.
See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 168-B:15 (1994). North Dakota criminalizes the use of a fetus in
research except to preserve the life or health of fetus or mother. See N.D. CENT. CODE 14-02.2-01
(1991). Ohio also prohibits theselling offetuses or experimentation upon fetuses. SeeOaWOREV.
CODE ANN. 2919.14 (1997). Oklahoma also prohibits the sale of fetuses as well as non-
therapeutic experimentation on fetuses resulting from abortion or intended to be aborted. See
OKLA.STAT. § 1-735(1996). Pennsylvaniacriminalizesnon-therapeuticresearchon conceptuss.
See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 3216 (1997). Rhode Island bans experimentation on live embryos
except for the life or health of the mother. See I. GEN. LAWS. § 11-54-1 (1994). Tennezzee
prohibits not only experimentation upon and sale of fetuses, but also prohibits the photographing
of aborted fetuses without the consent of the mother. SeeTE1,. CODEAD . § 39-15-203 (1997).
"T'Nikki Melina Constantine Bell, Regulating Transfer and Use of Fetal 7ssue in
Transplantation Procedures: The Ethical Dimensions, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 282 (1994).
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mortality at this stage." 71 With this premise, it was clear that the Panel
would approve some forms of research, although some members objected
to the creation of embryos specifically for this purpose." 2 Finally, in
1993, President Clinton issued an order directing the National Institute of
Health (NIH) not to allow funding for projects which involve creation of
embryos for research but allowing funding of research on so-called
"spare" embryos which were created for in vitro fertilization but not
used. 73 Currently, federal funds cannot be used for the creation of
research embryos. 74 Yet, no federal legislation exists to govern the
private sector.
The Human Research Panel's pronouncement on the status of the
embryo reflects fairly mainstream American values, which try to strike a
balance between competing rights.5 75 The right to privacy that has been
developed in the judiciary suggests a strong individual rights approach to
reproductive health law. Yet, there are examples where individual states
have taken a more activist approach in assessing the status of the embryo.
For instance, Louisiana has decided to extend rights to the embryo, and in
Minnesota, feticide is equivalent to homicide. 6 These countervailing
trends suggest that strong individual rights, which were sanctioned by
Roe, have been met with an opposing force. Yet the opponents of Roe
typically cast their rhetoric in the language of rights, too. Even the
Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, argued "[t]hat the
woman's liberty is not so unlimited... that from the outset the State
cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn, and at a later point in
fetal development the state's interest in life has sufficient force so that the
right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be restricted."' 77
The American system, perhaps more than any in the world,
exemplifies a deep-seated ambivalence about the status of embryos and
fetuses. The traditional appendage metaphor, common among judicial
opinions earlier in this century, gave way to the person metaphor in later
s~lReport ofthe Human Embryo Research Panel, Ethical Considerations in Pre-Implantation
Embryo Research, Vol. 1, no. 50 (Sept., 1994).
s72The Reporter on Human Reproduction and the Law, Nov.-Dec., 1994.
5711d. at 138.
'
74Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-78, 111 Stat. 1467 (1988).
575Id
76MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2662 (West 1999).
577Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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cases. This was due, in part, to the growing medical knowledge of fetal
development. Judges became increasingly deferential to this new
evidence. A new property metaphor emerged with cases such as Davis
andKass. Embryos posed even further challenges for legal analysts. The
variety of metaphors used strongly suggest that one "master" metaphor
will fail to capture adequately the nature of embryonic life. Just as
animals are used for different purposes, thus conferring status upon them,
embryos and fetuses should be treated the same way. Although animals
may be used in an instrumental manner, that does not mean we can do
anything we want with them. Our use of animals, whether as food,
clothing, companions or research subjects entails a variety of rules and
regulations. Similarly, our use of embryonic and fetal life should entail
a certain amount of rules and regulations, without seriously undermining
important scientific research and progress.
THEORIES OF PERSONHOOD
Fetal research opponents describe the procurement of fetal tissue
as "harvesting babies" and planned abortion as murder. This
language is more metaphorical than technical; it expresses their
values and political goals. Time and again the words chosen by
fetal research opponents simultaneously confer personhood to the
fetus, an unborn child is metaphorically more a person than is a
nonviable fetus in utero, and challenge the authority granted
experts by the use of technical jargon.?
[I]t is puzzling to me why so little attention should be paid to the
interests of sentient animals, who can suffer, and so much concern
expressed on behalf of beings, who, we have good reason to
believe, cannot experience harm or suffering at all.!7"
IfIhave any beliefs about immortality, it is that certain dogs I have
known will go to heaven, and very, very few persons.5-'
In discussing the moral status of embryos and fetuses, the issue of
personhood has dominated the discussion in bioethics. The person
57 8MAYNARMOODY, supra note 1, at 131.
579STEINBOCK, supra note 6, at 189.
560ld
"
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metaphor, while important, is only one of many metaphors in describing
the unborn. The moral status of embryos and fetuses may be analogized
to higher animals, in that although their status is conferred, it does not
give us permission to use them simply instrumentally. Using our moral
and metaphorical imagination, we can create a richer notion of what the
status of embryos and fetuses is.
"Persons, not humans, are special," according to Engelhardt. 8' On
the otherhand, Stanley Hauerwas contends that "[m]y Uncle Charlie is not
much of a person, but he is still my Uncle Charlie."582  Hauerwas's
observation concerning his uncle seems to conform to most people's moral
sympathies. Is personhood that important when assessing the moral worth
of entities?
The short answer is that it depends. For certain philosophers, such
as Engelhardt, personhood is of the utmost importance. 583 Only persons
can make demands of respect, earn praise or be blamed.5 4 For certain
theologians, humanhood is what matters. For instance, William May
believes that moral worth attaches to being a member of the human
species and not any other attribute.5 85 Although "a born-again Texan
Orthodox Catholic," Engelhardt espouses a secular set of criteria for
personhood that is not co-extensive with being biologically human.586 On
the other hand, theologians such as May confer moral worth on any entity
that exhibits human biological characteristics.587 For others, such as Erich
Loewy, the present or future capacity to suffer is what gives an entity
moral worth. 88 For Bonnie Steinbock, whether a fetus is a person or not
is not what matters.5 89 Rather, the question we should be asking is
whether the fetus has interests. 9 Finally, James Walters appeals to
s5lENGELHARDT, supra note 55, at 135.
... Stanley Hauerwas, Must a Patient Be a Person to Be a Patient? Or, My Uncle Charlie
is Not Much of a Person But He is Still My Uncle Charlie, in STEPHEN E. LAMMERS & ALLEN
VERHEY, MORAL MEDICINE: THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICs 273 (1987).
"
83ENGELHARDT, supra note 55, at xi.
S 4ENGELHARDT, supra note 55, at xi.
.. William E. May, Reverencing Human Life in its Generation, THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES
OF BIRTH AND DEATH, 72-73 (Franciscan Herald Press, 1980).
S86ENGELHARDT, supra note 55, at xi.
S"May, supra note 585, at 72.
588LOEWY, supra note 542.
589STEINBOCK, supra note 6.
s90d.
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personhood as a conceptual ideal, but does not slavishly adhere to it."'
For him, the closer a being approximates self-consciousness, the greater
is its moral status. 5 92
In trying to determine criteria for personhood and biological
humanhood, we are engaging in a task as old as Aristotle. He was perhaps
the first Western philosopher to categorize living things based on certain
attributes. 93 He argued in Book II of Psychology that all living things
have certain faculties, such as nutrition, sensation, appetite, locomotion
and thought. 94 Although plants only have the faculty ofnutrition, animals
have faculties for touch, locomotion and perhaps even imagination.P
Even granting the possibility that animals may have imaginations was
quite advanced; this view should be contrasted to Descartes' later view of
animals, which he viewed as mere automata.59 6
Although Aristotle reserved thought only for human beings, there
existed other views among the ancient Greeks. For instance, Pythagoras
developed the idea of animism, whereby both animals and humans share
the same kind of souls.5 97 These souls can be reincarnated from animals
to man and back again.595 Another view, mechanism, reduced both
animals and human beings to mere machines.59 9 Xenophon developed
another popular view, teleological anthropocentrism, which argued that
everything in the world was placed for man's benefit or profit! 3
For certain ancient writers, such as Aristotle, biology was highly
significant."' Only human beings had the capability of thought, and were
therefore more worthy of respect than animals.' This belief that
privileges membership in the species Hono Sapiens has been aptly
.
91\VALTERS, supra note 15.
5921d.
S9'RENF oRD BAMNBRAUGH, THE PHI-OSOPiY OF ARIsTOTLE 250 (New American Library,
1963).
594Id.
5
sSId
"
59Robert S. Brumbaugh, Of Man, Animals, and Morals: A BriefHistory, in ONITHEFIFTH
DAY: ANI ALuS RIGHTS AND HuraN Eimcs 6 (Richard Knowles Morris & Michael W. Fox, ef.,
Acropolis Books, 1978).
593Id.
599Id.
"9'Philip E. Devine, The Species Principle and t1e Potentiality Principle, in B10EHic:
READINGS AND CASES 136 (Prentice-Hall 19S7).602Id.
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dubbed speciesism. *°3 Phillip E. Devine advances an argument whereby
membership within the human species is what morally matters. 6 4 He
postulates that any member of the human species, from its earliest
development to its latest decay, is protected by this principle.6' 5 For
Devine, the biological humanity of an organism is recognizable in its
genetic structure.60 6 He contrasts this view of biological humanity with
Joseph Fletcher's view. 60 7 Fletcher's view suggests that an organism is
human if it has opposable thumbs, is capable of face-to-face coitus, and
has a 1400-gram brain.6 8 Devine wants to emphasize that a human
organism that lacks opposable thumbs but is still genetically human is
nevertheless a human being (albeit perhaps a defective one). 0 One reply
to Devine's analysis may be "so what." Just because a creature is
biologically human it does not follow that that organism merits greater
respect than another intelligent creature that lacks human biology. He
responds to the critic who charges that he is being merely chauvinistic in
preferring members of his own species over others by modifying his
original species principle.610 His modified species principle asks that in
assessing the moral worth of another, a human being must determine
whether that "other" possesses a certain level ofintelligence. 61 1 Therefore,
the intelligent Martian deserves protection against killing (unlike less
intelligent creatures). Intelligence, however, sounds like a criterion of
psychological personhood, rather than biological humanhood. In fact,
intelligence appears on Joseph Fletcher's often-cited list of indicators of
humanhood:6
12
(1) Minimal intelligence
(2) Self-awareness
(3) Self-control
(4) A sense of time
6031d.6
'4Id
"
6051Id.
6
"Devine, supra note 601, at 136.
60Id
6O3Id
"60Id.
61Old.
6'Devine, supra note 601, at 136.
"1It should be noted that Fletcher's humanhood is coextensive with psychological
personhood and not biological humanhood.
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(5) A sense of futurity
(6) A sense of the past
(7) The capability to relate to others
(8) Concern for others
(9) Communication
(10) Control of Existence
(11) Curiosity
(12) Balance of rationality/feeling
(13) Idiosyncrasy Change/changeability
(14) Neo-cortical function 13
Engelhardt offers a well-analyzed distinctionbetween "being human"
and personhood. Engelhardt views humanhood as a taxonomic
classification whereby a member of the family Hominidae exhibits certain
biological characteristics, such as long limbs, pentadactyl hands and feet,
and increased neural development. 4 For Engelhardt these biological
features become morally important only when they characterizepersons.615
Being human is important because human beings usually are self-
conscious, rational and possess a moral sense.1 6 But such attributes are
not the sole reserve of human beings. Engelhardt has not wavered from
his commitment to persons vis-a-vis humans for several years. For
instance, in an essay written in the early 19SOs, he uses the term human
merely as taxonomy, whereby a human is in "the genus homo in the
family hominidae of the suborder anthropoidae of the order primates of
the class mammalia.
' 617
Most philosophers seem to agree with Engelhardt that biological
characteristics oflhumanhood are morally irrelevant. Caroline Whitbeck
echoes Engelhardt's contention that human biology is morally
irrelevant. 18 She argues that having a certain chromosomal pattern is not
significant, because human people have the same pattern as human tissue,
yet we are reluctant to argue that hair (or even the heart) has moral
61JOSEPHFLETCHER, HrMANHOOD: ESSAYSINBIOM.EDiCA,,LETHICS 15 (Prometheus Boo s,
1979).
6
'ENGELHARDT, supra note 55.6151d.6161d. at 138.6171d. at 189.
618Carol Whitbeck, The Aforal Implications of Regarding Women as People: e 'v
Perspectives on Pregnancy and Personhood, ABORTION AND THE STATUS OF THE FETUS 255.
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status.619 Mary Anne Warren argues that being a human being in the
genetic sense does not grant a creature moral status automatically. 620 She,
like Engelhardt, offers a certain set of criteria for personhood: 1)
consciousness and the ability to feel pain; 2) reasoning; 3) self-motivated
activity; 4) capacity to communicate; and 5) presence of self-concepts and
self-awareness. 621 We can see that Warren's list of personhood criteria
encompasses not only psychological traits (self-awareness, self-motivated
capacity), but biological traits as well (ability to feel pain, capacity to
communicate). This suggests that the gulfbetween biological humanhood
and psychological personhood is not that great. For instance, if a creature
lacked the psychological traits of reasoning, self-motivated activity and
self-awareness, yetpossessed the ability to feel pain and communicate, we
would be quite reluctant to claim that this creature is a nonperson. In
sharp contrast to Warren's high criteria of personhood (which is similar
to Michael Tooley's high standard of personhood) 622 is John Noonan's
contention that presence of a genetic code is what grants moral status to
a creature.623 Noonan offers a simple approach: if you are conceived of
human parents, you are therefore human and deserving of moral status.624
Noonan makes no distinctions based on the psychological criteria that
625Engelhardt uses.
Some, however, contend that the psychological criteria Engelhardt
uses in defining personhood (self-consciousness, rationality, a moral sense
and a sense of freedom) are just as arbitrary as the biological criteria for
humanhood.626 Don Marquis raises this issue, and then offers Joel
Feinberg's defense of these psychological categories. 627 Feinberg argues
that certain criteria are morally irrelevant (such as race, sex or species
6191d
"
62
°Mary Anne Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of.Abortion, in Thomas Mappes and
Jane Zembaty, eds., BIOMEDICAL ETHIcs 418 (McGraw-Hill, 1981).6211d.
622Ruth Macklin, Personhood in the Bioethics Literature, 61 MILBANK MEMORIAL Q.
HEALTH & Soc'y, 35,40 (1983). Tooley's high standard is as follows: "An organism possesses
a serious right to life [i.e., is a person] only if it possesses the concepts of a self as a continuing
subject of experiences and other mental states, and believes that it is itself such a continuing
entity." With his theory, Tooley admits that infanticide is a permissible practice.
62Id. at 52.
6241d. at 41.
625ld.
6
'
6Don Marquis, Why Abortion is Immoral, 86 J. PHIL. 183, 187 (1989).62 1d. at 186-87.
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membership).128  However, only because of the very nature of being
conscious and rational can we as persons assume rights and duties.
62 9
Feinberg, in another article, concedes that although only persons can have
duties, animals can be the bearers of rights, although they are incapable of
exercising rights themselves. 630
It seems, then, that being a person, as opposed to being biologically
human, entails certain important psychological features. For some, such
as Engelhardt, the psychological characteristics of rationality and self-
consciousness are important.631 For others, such as Hauerwas and Robert
Solomon, it is the social context whereby beings have status that is
paramount.632 Solomon is critical of Engelhardt's rigid classifications
because they seem to exclude many people.633 How many people are truly
rational, self-conscious and free? What if someone believes the end of the
world is near? Or practices witchcraft? Do these people fall outside of the
realm of persons? Solomon would be reluctant to make such a claim.6 4
For him, our very notion of personhood is a peculiarly Western
construct.6 35 Similarly, Mark Johnson argues that the very metaphor of
person is masculinist in its conception.636 Moreover, he would argue, it is
radial, whereby sane, white, heterosexual males occupy the prototypical
categories, and everyone else (females, nonwhites, children, senile elderly,
mentally handicapped) occupy the outlying regions (and higher primates
occupy the furthest regions).637 For both Solomon and Johnson, the
m'id. at 186.
'291d. at 187.
"Joel Feinberg, The Rights ofAnimals and Unborn Generations, in T. BEAUCHA.M' & L.
WALTERS, CONTEMPORARY IssuEs IN BIOETICS, 155-156 (2d ed. 1982).
31ENGELHARDT, supra note 55, at 105.
"32 Robert Solomon, Reflections on the Meaning of (Fetal) Life, in ABORTOi AND THE
STATUS OF THE FETUs, 217.
63Id. at 216.
Id.
0S5 d. at 215.
MAIRK JOHNSON, MORAL IMAGINATION (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press 1993).
Johnson believes that trying to define person entails a number of problems: "[W]hat is going to
define the concept person? Is it our material, physical being? Oar biological self?. Oursocial and
interpersonal selves defined by roles? Our psychoanalytic self? Our developmental self (as in
stages of life)? Our autobiographical self? Our legal self? Our theological self?. Our political self?
Everyone of these complex conceptions of selfhood and personality presuppose a massive
background of values, folk theories, cognitive models, and so forth that give it meaning and
reality. To think that anybody could grasp what the concept means as it is 'understood in itself'
is to strain credibility beyond the breaking point." Id at 97-98.637Id.
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person metaphor seems to reflect certain bourgeois values of rational self-
interest and liberty. Solomon finds the concept of personhood to be an
ultimately social construct and intrinsic value to be a social convention
that serves the good of society as a whole.638
Similar to Engelhardt and Warren, Daniel Dennett also offers a set
of criteria or conditions to judge personhood. 639 His conditions are the
following:
(1) rationality;
(2) a state of consciousness (or intentional predicates);
(3) an attitude taken toward it;
(4) ability to reciprocate;
(5) verbal communication; and
(6) self-consciousness." '
The concepts of personhood as outlined by Engelhardt, Warren and
Dennett may be characterized as idealized concepts ofpersonhood. Like
John Rawls's representatives in the original position, these concepts of
persons are models and not flesh and blood human beings.641 A recurring
critique of both Rawls's theories and these concepts ofpersonhood is that
they are too abstract and do not really reflect the way "real" people live
and behave.642 This critique has some merit. As Solomon and Johnson
have mentioned, these idealized concepts of personhood will inevitably
leave out certain classes of people. Solomon believes that the notion of
personhood reflects a Western bias toward rationality, as a way to
subjugate less rational beings. 3 Johnson also believes that the idealized
concept of "person" encompasses a narrow set (heterosexual, white, sane
males) while excluding others.644 A richer, more pluralistic notion of
person is needed.
63 Solomon, supra note 632, at 209-26.63 Daniel Dennett, Conditions of Personhood, in PUZZLES, PARADOXES AND PROBLEMS
(Peter A. French and Curtis Brown, eds., St. Martin's Press 1987).
64d.
641ONORA O'NEIL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT'S PRACTICAL
PHILOSOPHY 211 (Cambridge University Press, 1990).
642Id. at 212.
"Solomon, supra note 632, at 215.
644JOHNSON, supra note 636, at 97.
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With these critiques in mind, Engelhardt hedges his bets by allowing
for a second class of persons, what he calls persons in the social sense.0'
These entities lack certain psychological criteria, such as rationality, yet
we as persons in the strict sense have deemed them worthy enough to be
within the moral community of quasi-persons."6 This looser category of
social persons encompasses entities that are on theperiphery; the severely
retarded, the those with severe dementia and infants.5"7 All of these
creatures share some human biology and yet they do not qualify for
personhood in the strict sense."48 For instance, a severely handicapped
infant that dies shortly after birth has the attributes of a biological human.
Yet it lacks any psychological traits that would make it a person. For
Noonan, such creatures are human (conceived of human parents) and
deserving of moral respect. 49 For Engelhardt, such creatures are probably
nonpersons, exhibiting none of the psychological criteria of persons."'
Although they may merit our sympathies, they cannot demand our respect.
These categories of what constitutes a person vis-a-vis a biological
human is important in the controversy over the fetus and embryo. For
instance, Engelhardt argues that only persons can demand respect, earn
praise or be blamed. 51 Persons are the constituents of the moral
community. Perhaps a better metaphor would be to call persons the
stewards of the moral community. Persons have both rights and duties
within the moral community of "spaceship earth." Persons in the social
sense, as well as nonpersons, can only be assigned rights, but not duties.
Therefore, the retarded, the senile, and even certain animals have certain
rights but not duties.
For Kant, persons matter because only persons can offer consent to
do certain things.652 Within this consent-based theory (which Engelhardt
calls his principle of permission) only persons can offer their consent.6"
Things, on the other hand, can never offer consent to act because they lack
'
5ENGELHARDT, supra note 55, at 116.
64'Id. at 117.
67Id.
64Id.
"Macklin, supra note 622, at 41.
65'ENGELHARDT, supra note 55, at 117.
'S1Id. at 119.
020'NEIL, supra note 641, at 138.
6'Id. at 138.
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capacities for agency.654 Here is where the difference betweenpersonhood
and biological humanhood becomes significant. If a biologically human
organism is a thing rather than a person, then it has only instrumental
value. The biological human nonperson cannot give consent because it
lacks the capacity to give consent. Therefore, if the fetus is merely a
biologically human organism, it can be treated in an instrumental fashion.
Right away, however, we encounter some problems. For instance,
not all things have merely instrumental value. Most people treat Leonard
da Vinci's Mona Lisa as having intrinsic value, and some people even treat
an Action Comics #1 issue as having more than mere instrumental value.
However, these things do not have value in and of themselves. Only
persons can grant things (but not other persons) certain value. Therefore,
if no person ever valued (or will value) the first issue of Action Comics,
it would be rather unproblematic if it was disposed of.
Kant seems to make the distinction between persons and non-
persons, prompting Robert Nozick to comment that utilitarianism is
appropriate for animals whereas deontology is reserved for persons
only.655 Using animals for our benefit, however, is not unproblematic. As
Keith Thomas argues, our Western sensibility toward animals has shifted
quite dramatically during the modem period.656 We now debate whether
we can morally use animals for our own purposes. However, this debate
has its limits. Although we condemn the torture of animals, we do permit
widespread animal slaughter for our consumption. This brings up a
quandary. If the human fetus and embryo are nonpersons, and if many
adult mammals have claims to social person status, why is abortion or
fetal research a more troublesome moral issue than human consumption
of animals? Philosophers like Engelhardt who deny the personhood status
of fetuses (only within his secular moral framework and not within his
personal religious framework) are denying that our sensibilities are shaped
not just by psychology but by biological morphology as well. For
instance, an eight-week-old fetus shares many of the morphological
characteristics of a newborn. It is visibly humanoid in shape. Most
people who are tolerant of abortion have certain visceral responses to
654Id.
655ENGELHARDT, supra note 55, at 113.
656'-OMAS, supra note 531, at 300.
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seeing such a creature being destroyed.6 " Why does such a response
exist? To some extent, we have been socialized into a sentimentalized
view of infancy and childhood. If a being looks like an infant, then it
deserves the care that an infant would normally receive. Anything that is
a diminutive version of a human being seems to automatically receive
persons' sympathy, regardless as to whether the entity exhibits traits of
personhood. This has little to do with the fetus's potential for becoming
a person. Rather, the fetus's appearance suggests that this is a vulnerable,
living entity, in and of itself. The child metaphor is a powerful one; it
strongly suggests that the fetus is more thanjust a clump of cells but rather
a vulnerable creature that deserves our care and affection based upon
human sympathy.
Of course, this does not stand up to logical scrutiny. Just because an
entity looks like an infant, it does not follow that that entity deserves the
same level of care or respect that an infant deserves. But the power of
images is undeniable. Part of the success of the film E.T. is that E.T. is
not only a person but actually looks like a human being. Contrast E.T.
with HAL in the film 2001: A Space Odyssey. Whereas E.T. is a young
extra-terrestrial that exhibits certain humanoid features, such as an
enlarged cranium and bipedal locomotion, HAL the computer lacks any
of these humanoid characteristics. Although HAL meets the criteria of
strict personhood that Engelhardt outlines, HAL does not evoke the
sympathy that E.T. does. Moreover, both E.T. and HAL, being persons,
have the capacity to suffer. According to Erich Loewy, any creature that
has the ability to suffer deserves moral regard. If, therefore, the fetus can
suffer (and not just feel pain), then the fetus deserves some moral worth.653
Yet, for some reason, our moral sympathies seem to be stronger with
creatures that share our humanoid (or at least mammalian) features.
With regard to the fetus, does it matter whether it is a person or a
biological human? One would think that if the fetus was a person, we
would then be prohibited from taking its life, except in self-defense. But
Judith Jarvis Thompson's classic analysis takes us to task for such
thinking. Her argument is that we normally have no duty to rescue
6
"Tooley would argue that such visceral responses are merely that-visceral-ith no sound
moral reasoning behind them. He would argue that our revulsion at infanticide is a cultural taboo
no different than earlier cultural taboos against oral sex or masturbation. Sce Macklin, supra note
622, at 45.
SSLOE\WY, supra note 542, at 2.
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another.659 The state cannot morally coerce people to save others, even if
their lives depend on it.660 Her argument has been criticized because it
wrongly analogizes a stranger's duty to another, whereas a mother is
hardly a stranger to her fetus. 661' But is this true? A stranger is one who
is unknown. Can we claim that by merely occupying a part of the
mother's body, the fetus is a known entity, a moral intimate? Typically,
a stranger becomes an acquaintance or a friend through social discourse.
One would be at a loss to describe a relationship that did not entail some
sort of social exchange. If, between two parties, one initiated social
contact, but the other either failed or was incapable of reciprocating, we
would be hard pressed to describe such a situation as a social exchange.
Although mothers develop a certain kind of bond with their gestating
fetus, this relationship fully blossoms when the infant is born. And even
then, the child's social status would not require one to sacrifice himself for
the child's sake. It would be morally impermissible for the state to coerce
family members to act in a supererogatory manner toward other family
members. One is reminded of certain legal cases where the courts have
refused to coerce family members to undergo bone marrow transplants to
save relatives.662
Legally, the distinction between personhood and being biologically
human is significant on two levels, constitutionally and statutorily. The
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade addressed the issue ofpersonhood, citing
both appellee's arguments and amicus briefs. 663 The appellee, however,
conceded that no case has held a fetus to be a person within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6" Justice Blacknun, in his majority
opinion, held that in every instance where the word person is used in the
Constitution, it is meant post-natally and not prenatally. 66 Unfortunately,
Blackmun relies on the legal practice of abortion during the nineteenth
S9Id. at 2.
660Id.
"Carolyn Whitbeck, Women as People: Pregnancy and Personhood, 13 PHIL. & MED.
251,254 (1983).
6"See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (I11. 1990) (holding that adopted mother of two
twins could refuse to consent to submit her adopted twins to blood tests to determine if the twins
could donate bone marrow to their biological father); see Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn.
1972) (holding that parents of twin boys could consent to transferring a kidney from one twin to
his ill brother).
6"Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1972).
6"4Id.
"5Id.
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century as evidence that the word person, as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, does not include the unbom. 6 Relying on historic
precedent to determine the morality or legality of a practice is abit shaky.
For instance, let's suppose that slavery was still a legal practice in some
states. Someone defending the practice would be hardly justified at
looking at nineteenth century practice as any legitimization ofthepractice.
The mere fact that slavery was widely practiced in certain parts of the
United States in the nineteenth century would not legitimize its current
practice.
Ronald Dworkin agrees that the fetus has never been a constitutional
person, nor can it be declared a legal person if it seriously impairs a
person's interests.667 In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the
Court had to address the constitutionality ofa Missouri statute that defined
human life as beginning at conception and that unborn children have
protectable interests in life, health, and well being." 9 The Court found
such language to merely reflect a value of the state preferring childbirth
over abortion, and that this language offers protection to unborn children
similar to tort and probate law.670
The other level of legal recognition is on the statutory level. In State
v. Merrill671 the Supreme Court of Minnesota had to address the following
statutes:
Whoever does any of the following is guilty of murder of an
unborn child in the first degree and must be sentenced to
imprisonment for life:
(7) causes the death of an unborn child with premeditation
and with intent to effect the death of the unborn child or
of another...'
Whoever does either of the following is guilty of murder of an
unborn child in the second degree and may be sentenced to
imprisonment for not more than forty years:
(1) causes the death of an unborn child with the intent to
6-Id.
6DWORKIN, supra note 492, at 168.
"SWebster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1990).
66Id. at 501.
6 01d. at 519.
67'State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (iinn. 1990), cert. denicd. 496 U.S. 931.
62N!wN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2661(l) (1988).
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effect the death of that unborn child or another, but
without premeditation...673
Merrill was appealing a conviction whereby he was convicted for the
death of Gail Anderson's "unborn child." 674 Anderson died of gunshot
wounds, and an autopsy revealed that Anderson was pregnant with a
twenty-seven or twenty-eight day embryo.675 After hearing arguments on
both sides, the court held that:
[T]he statutes do not raise the issue of when life as a human person
begins or ends. The state must prove only that the implanted
embryo or the fetus in the mother's womb was living, that it had
life, and that it has life no longer. To have life, as that term is
commonly understood, means to have the property of all living
things to grow, to become. It is not necessary to prove, nor does
the statute require, that the living organism in the womb in its
embryonic or fetal state be considered a person or a human being.
People are free to differ or abstain on the profound philosophical
and moral questions of whether an embryo or fetus is ensouled or
acquires "personhood." These questions are entirely irrelevant to
criminal liability under the statute. Criminal liability here requires
only that the genetically human embryo be a living organism that
is growing into a human being. Death occurs when the embryo is
no longer living, when it ceases to have the properties of life.676
The court's opinion looks only to the biological status of the fetus. It
ignores issues of consciousness and rationality that encumber the
personhood debate in the bioethics literature. Rather, the court adopts an
approach that could easily be written by John Noonan. The court did
distinguish this case from that of a mother aborting her fetus, which is a
protected constitutional activity. InMerrill, the mother did not consent to
having her fetus aborted.677 The majority did consider the interest of the
mother, but did not consider the status of the fetus independently.678 One
673MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2662(1) (1988).
"
4Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 320.
671Id.
.
6Id. at 324.
77Id. at 321.
678Id.
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commentator claims that none of the justices on the Minnesota Supreme
Court considered the status of the embryo or fetus independently. 679 This
would be the case if the embryo was ax utero.GS In short, the court
determined that the statute protects human life and not personhood."'
The Merrill case bears on the personhood debate in important ways.
The court wanted to avoid the complex questions ofpersonhood that have
plagued bioethicists for years.6 12 In doing so, the court looked only to
biological status and committed the fallacy of biological speciesism. The
court believed that there is more consensus over the biological status of
the embryo or fetus than there is over the personhood status. S3 Even this,
however, is a questionable claim. Among philosophers there is mostly
consensus, but some dissent persists.6 4 There is no paradigmatic set of
criteria ofpersonhood that would satisfy everyone in every situation. Our
notions ofpersonhood are heavily indebted to modem philosophers such
as Locke and Kant, and their ideas have been shaped by contemporary
philosophers such as Nozick, Engelhardt, Warren and Tooley. But as
Mark Johnson has argued, the concept "person" is so complex that to
argue that one set of criteria would suffice for all time is the height of
folly.6s5 The concept ofpersonhood is a useful analytic tool, but it cannot
be the sine qua non of moral status.
The person metaphor, however, does have an undeniable power.
Take, for instance, the medieval "homonculus" view that the sperm itself
contains a fully formed miniature human being that grows to baby size
after it is introduced into an egg.66 The eighteenth century writer
Laurence Sterne popularized this view in Tristram Shandy which held that
the homonculus "consists as we do, of skin, hair, fat, flesh, veins, arteries,
ligaments, nerves, cartilages, bones, marrow, brains, gland, genitals,
humors, and articulations-a being of as much activity-and in all senses
of the word, as much and as truly our fellow-creature as my Lord
6'Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 320.6s"Id. at 324.
62Id.
a'Id.
6
"Macklin, supra note 622, at 41.
ESJOHNSON, supra note 636, at 98.
SGeorge J. Annas, What Should We Do With Surplus Potential Humans? WIASH. POST,
Mar. 31, 1985, at KO.
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Chancellor of England." '687 George Annas sees a modem counterpart in
the language of former President Ronald Reagan, who argued in 1984 that
"until and unless someone can establish that the unborn child is not a
living human being, then that child is already protected by the
Constitution., 688 Annas has noted that
[T]he human embryo is equal to more than the sum of its
constituent parts. Not only does it have the complete genetic
complement of a unique human being, it is also a powerful symbol
of human regeneration and the future of the human race. We can
thus value it and afford it legal protection from exploitation even
though we do not similarly value or protect either the human egg
or sperm.
689
Does it serve us to insist upon the traditional metaphors of person or
property in describing fetuses and embryos? Our metaphorical
imagination is often stunted when faced with creatures such as fetuses and
embryos. Judges and policymakers often describe such creatures as being
in a special category that deserve special respect. Animals occupy a
similar category.
Our metaphorical imagination regarding animals has a rich and long
history. In the Ark myth, God commands Noah to save only the animals,
suggesting that animals are morally innocent as well as vulnerable
creatures.6' Animals have been tortured for sport, used for food and have
been raised as household companions. We seem to have refined our
modem sensibilities toward animals, yet we still hold almost contradictory
views towards them. Torturing animals is considered morally
reprehensible, but the humane slaughter of them is considered a
permissible practice. If, as some have argued, animals suffer and have
interests, then such practices would be more troublesome than the
destruction of spare embryos or even early fetuses which have no present
interests (albeit perhaps future interests). Although the person metaphor
has dominated the bioethics literature, it is evident that a variety of
metaphors have been used in legal opinions. As important as personhood
is, we should not allow debate concerning embryos and fetuses to be
6871d
"6881d.
6891d.
69See Genesis 5:5.
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dominated by such a metaphor. Many objects, both inanimate and
animate, deserve our sympathy and care, regardless as to whether they
meet any strict criteria ofpersonhood. For instance, there are more federal
regulations in place for the protection of animal research subjects than for
human subjects. 9 This suggests that we do not simply use animals as
instrumental means, but rather have stringent rules that guide us in our
behavior.
Another interesting metaphor is that of the symbol. Bioethicists
frequently refer to the embryo and/or fetus as a powerful symbol of our
humanity.692 What does this exactly mean? Certain animals have evolved
into powerful cultural symbols. The dove represents peace, the hawk
represents war and the owl represents wisdom (at least in certain Western
traditions). But what does the fetus and embryo represent? One
commentator claims that
[The fetus] is a symbol of hope and renewal, and its unseen
development a source of amazement. Fetal life is the shared story
of the human experience: no matter how diverse our postnatal
lives, the fetus tells of our biological past and future. Although
people disagree vehemently about abortion's morality, abortion,
whether for medical or other reasons, is always a tragedy .... For
parents the wanted fetus becomes a touchstone for our hopes, just
as the unhealthy or unwanted one is a source of anxiety and
dread.693
Embryos and fetuses represents a variety of things. Metaphorically, they
are chameleon-like, with no definitive "status" or role. As Bartha
Knoppers has argued:
[t]he absence of a definitive legal status does not serve to deprive
the embryo of legal protection. Biological reality avoids the
treatment of the embryo and foetus as in abstracto entities, since
they are undergoing constant development and are intertvned with
their "sources"--living persons, holders of rights and freedoms. It
is precisely this absence of status which has forced creative and
viable solutions. Neither person nor thing, the "humanity" of the
'9'Feinberg, supra note 630, at 155.
6'9AYNARD-MO0DY, supra note 1, at 184.
693MAYNARD-MOODY, supra note 1, at 184.
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embryo and foetus benefits from the kaleidoscope of state
intervention ranging from fundamental rights, to criminal law, to
private law or even, specific legislation. From these various
modalities of intervention has emerged a regime of protection with
multiple tools adapted to different stages of human life, to different
technologies and to the interests involved. Paradoxically, in the
long run, these diverse approaches provide better protection.694
Similarly, the moral status of embryos and fetuses need not be definitively
defined in order to arrange for certain protections. Animals occupy a
variety of roles in our culture; very few would argue that animals are
persons in a strict sense or mere things in the most mundane sense. Yet
we seem to be able to create rules that protect their conferred interests.
Why should embryos and fetuses be any different?
CONCLUSION
Embryos and fetuses occupy a moral status not entirely dissimilar from
that of higher animals. The great variety of metaphors used to describe
both the unborn and animals strongly suggest that they lack a definitive
status. The many metaphors also suggest that there are a plurality of
contexts we must be attentive and sensitive toward. These different
contexts shape which morally relevant criteria (sentience, ability to suffer)
will exert greater influence.
Our metaphorical understandings of embryos and fetuses shape our
moral relationships with them. For instance, the philosophers surveyed
above adhere rigidly to a strong definition ofpersonhood. Their metaphor
of person seems to include only those creatures that fit the rigid set of
criteria they have developed. The philosophers' use of personhood is a
somewhat useful heuristic, but it fails to fully capture the moral
complexity of embryos and fetuses. On the other hand, the legal opinions
analyzed here seem to be closer to the truth when they concede that
although fetuses and embryos may not be persons in the full sense, they
are still entitled to certain kinds of respect and moral regard. Thus, the
metaphor that seems most appropriate is the notion of stewardship. This
suggests that we as human beings and persons act as stewards with regards
to embryos and fetuses. This is quite similar to our moral relationship to
694Knoppers & Pascal-Rossi, supra note 5.
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animals, as well as the environment. In fact, there is a sizeable literature
that discusses human beings' moral stewardship of environmental
resources for future generations.
The metaphor of steward suggests a certain moral regard that does
not necessarily invoke the traditional metaphors of person, property or
appendage. Thus, this approach does not offer a new metaphor for
embryos and fetuses, but rather a new metaphor for our relationship Ath
these human entities. The metaphor of stewardship suggests that these
creatures are within our moral regard. We are not permitted to treat them
as mere things. Rather, they have certain intrinsic and conferred interests.
Moral stewardship suggests that we as human beings and persons
view human embryos and fetuses with a special kind ofregard. Although
they lack the criteria to be persons in a strict sense, their development into
participants within the human community requires that we treat them vth
a modicum of respect. This primafacie duty of respect for the unborn
does not mean that it is absolute, of course. As we have seen in many
cases, if the rights of the mother conflict with that of the fetus, the
mother's rights are the ones that are usually respected. But this does not
necessarily denigrate the status of the unborn to a mere thing. The cases
analyzed above illustrate the types of decisions courts make when faced
with the issue of embryonic and fetal status. The judges in earlier cases
would often rely on common law precedent or their own intuitions. Later
judges would also acknowledge the burgeoning medical knowledge
regarding embryos and fetuses. This kind of quasi-casuistic approach has
served American judges well, considering the sheer number of cases that
have come before the courts.
The variety of metaphors we use troubles us at times, yet we are still
able to create rules that protect prenatal life while balancing those interests
with the rights of others. Moral stewardship does not mean we sacrifice
all other values to promote the interests of prenatal life. Rather, it does
suggest that we have certainprimafacie duties to the unborn that may be
overridden in certain circumstances. Such an approach values prenatal life
in a way that is both humane and fair.
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